A Theory of the Currency Denomination of International Trade\textsuperscript{1}

Philippe Bacchetta  Eric van Wincoop
Study Center Gerzensee  University of Virginia
University of Lausanne  CEPR

November 2001

\textsuperscript{1}We would like to thank seminar participants at the Universities of Lausanne, Pompeu Fabra, Toulouse and Virginia, as well as participants to The Nederlandsche Bank’s conference on ‘Understanding Exchange Rates’. Pierre-Alain Bruchez provided excellent research assistance. Bacchetta’s work on this paper is part of a research network on ‘The Analysis of International Capital Markets: Understanding Europe’s role in the Global Economy,’ funded by the European Commission under the Research Training Network Program (Contract No. HPRN-CT-1999-00067).
Abstract

Nominal rigidities due to menu costs have become a standard element in closed economy macroeconomic modeling. The “New Open Economy Macroeconomics” literature has investigated the implications of nominal rigidities in an open economy context and found that the currency in which prices are set has significant implications for exchange rate pass-through to import prices, the level of trade and net capital flows, and optimal monetary and exchange rate policy. While the literature has exogenously assumed in which currencies goods are priced, in this paper we solve for the equilibrium optimal pricing strategies of firms. We find that the higher the market share of an exporting country in an industry, and the more differentiated its goods, the more likely its exporters will price in the exporter’s currency. Country size and the cyclicality of real wages play a role as well, but are empirically less important. We also show that when a set of countries forms a monetary union, the new currency is likely to be used more extensively in trade than the sum of the currencies it replaces.
I Introduction

The key assumption in new Keynesian macroeconomics is that prices are infrequently adjusted due to small menu costs. At the international level, however, there is an entirely different dimension to this issue. If exporting firms set prices in foreign markets, and infrequently adjust them, in what currency should they set these prices? One reason why this is an important question is revealed in Figure 1, which shows a clear negative relationship between the fraction of imports invoiced in the importer’s currency and the pass-through of exchange rate changes to import prices for a set of 7 industrialized countries.\footnote{We take the short-term pass-through coefficients from Jose Campa and Linda Goldberg (2001, Table 2) and the invoicing data for the year 1995 from Peter Bekx (1998).} If firms set prices in the importer’s currency, we should expect zero pass-through. If instead prices are set in the exporter’s currency, we should see full pass-through. Incomplete pass-through can explain the observed large volatility of real exchange rates and the significant correlation between nominal and real exchange rates. The extent of pass-through also has profound implications for monetary policy. The recent “new-open economy macroeconomics” literature, which has adopted the new-Keynesian assumption of rigid prices in an open economy context, has shown that assumptions about invoicing are critical for optimal monetary policy and the choice of exchange rate system.\footnote{The issue of optimal monetary and exchange rate policy is analyzed in Philippe Bacchetta and Eric van Wincoop (2000), Giancarlo Corsetti and Paolo Pesenti (2001) and Michael B. Devereux and Charles Engel (1998). Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998,2000) also show that the level of trade and net capital flows are affected by the invoicing choice. Engel (2001) provides a survey of the implications of different pricing strategies. For general descriptions of the new open economy macro literature, see Philip R. Lane (2001), Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff (1996), Obsteld (2001) and Brian Doyle’s new open economy macro web page http://www.geocities.com/brian_m_doyle/open.html.}

The main objective of this paper is to derive and understand the optimal invoicing decisions in the context of “new open economy macroeconomics” models. While most of the literature has assumed exogenously that firms set prices either in their own currency or in that of the importer, firms are not neutral between these choices. The optimal invoicing choice of firms depends on the uncertainty of their profits under different invoicing strategies. We show that the two most important factors determining the invoicing choice based on the theory are (i) the market

1
share of an exporting country in a foreign market, and (ii) the extent to which products of domestic firms are substitutes for those of competing foreign firms. The higher the exporter’s market share in an industry, and the more differentiated the products, the more likely firms are to price in the exporter’s currency. On the other hand, international competition will be strong when the market share of the exporting country is low and its goods are close substitutes with those of foreign competitors. In that case exporting firms are more likely to price in the currencies of their foreign competitors.

There is some evidence indicating that these two factors are indeed empirically relevant. Koichi Hamada and Akiyoshi Horiuchi (1987), analyzing a 1984 survey of Japanese firms, write that “...Japanese firms report that a principal reason for foreign-currency-invoiced export contracts is the hard pressure from international competition.” More formal evidence comes from the pass-through literature. Robert Feenstra et. al. (1996) show that for the automobile industry a high market share of an exporting country is associated with a relatively high pass-through
elasticity for that country’s exporters.\footnote{Along similar lines, Richard Feinberg (1986) finds that import pass-through in Germany is higher in sectors where the import share is larger.} Jiwen Yang (1997) finds a positive relationship between US import pass-through elasticities for three and four-digit SIC industries and different proxies of product differentiation. Sectoral invoicing data could provide the most convincing evidence, but such data are scarce. Giorgio Basevi et. al. (1987) and Page (1980) provide some evidence indicating that invoicing in the exporter’s currency is more common in more differentiated goods sectors. For aggregate invoicing data Figure 2 shows a clear positive relationship between the trade-weighted average market share of an exporting country and the fraction of its exports invoiced in the exporter’s currency.\footnote{Market share is defined as manufacturing exports to a country divided by total manufacturing sales in that country (gross output plus imports). Since these are aggregate data, the levels are not very meaningful; our interest is in differences across countries.} The US and Germany have a significantly higher average market share than the other countries and also have the largest fractions invoiced in their own currency. Japan has the lowest fraction of exports invoiced in its own currency. While Japan is the second biggest industrialized country, it has a small market share both because its exports are small relative to its GDP, and because more than half of its exports to industrialized countries go to the United States.\footnote{Japan’s goods are also relatively close substitutes with those of competitors. Peter Hooper et.al. (1998) find that the overall export price elasticity is higher for Japan than for other industrialized countries, suggesting that Japan’s goods are less differentiated than those of others. We have also computed for each country’s exports a trade-weighted average elasticity of substitution for 62 commodity-groups, using estimates of elasticities for each of these groups from David Hummels (1999). Japan has indeed the highest elasticity.}

Two recent papers look at the optimal currency denomination of trade in the context of the “new open economy macroeconomics”.\footnote{There is another literature that examines the choice of currency as a medium of exchange. See, for example, Helene Rey (2001) for an interesting contribution. In our context, this dimension is orthogonal to the invoicing decision.} In Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2001), we numerically solve the invoicing decision in a general equilibrium model. The optimal strategy depends on various preference parameters, but the intuition is far from clear. Devereux and Engel (2001) derive an analytical solution to the invoicing choice under a particular parameterization. They show that countries with lower monetary volatility may prefer to price in their own currency.

\footnote{There is another literature that examines the choice of currency as a medium of exchange. See, for example, Helene Rey (2001) for an interesting contribution. In our context, this dimension is orthogonal to the invoicing decision.}
It is very difficult to understand the results from such general equilibrium models as various mechanisms are at work. The robustness of these results is also difficult to evaluate.

Our starting point here is that of an older partial equilibrium currency invoicing literature, which studies the invoicing decision of a single firm selling in a foreign market and setting the price before the exchange rate is known. While this literature has easily identifiable limitations, it provides us with a simple starting point and allows us to connect the existing theoretical literature on the subject of currency invoicing with the more modern “new open economy macro” general equilibrium models. The very simple setup of this older literature already provides insights on the role of product differentiation (or demand elasticity).

In order to gain intuition about the optimal invoicing strategies we extend the simple “old-style” partial equilibrium model in several steps. Each step provides additional insights that would be hard to understand when taken all at once. We first extend the model by allowing firms to take the invoicing decisions of other
firms into account. This leads to strategic complementarities. Market share of the exporting country then becomes a critical factor. We consider both a two-country and multi-country version of the partial equilibrium model. The latter provides relevant insights about the implications of European Monetary Union. We then extend the model to a general equilibrium setting, in which the exchange rate is endogenous, by introducing stochastic aggregate demand through monetary shocks. In order to simplify matters, we first keep nominal wages fixed by allowing for nominal rigidities in the labor market. The results then turn out to be essentially the same as in the partial equilibrium model. When allowing for nominal wage flexibility, we first consider a constant real wage. In that case country size plays a role separate from market share. In the last step we allow for real wage volatility. While country size and real wage volatility can theoretically play a role, we argue that empirically they are not very relevant. Finally, we briefly discuss an extension that allows for complete asset markets; the rest of the paper assumes that there is no trade in assets.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we discuss a partial equilibrium model of invoicing, starting with a framework familiar from the old currency invoicing literature. We then extend the model to allow firms to pay attention to the invoicing decisions of competing firms, first in a two-country setup and then in a multi-country setup. We derive results analytically by focusing on small levels of risk. Section III builds on the findings of section II by expanding the model to a general equilibrium setup. Section IV offers conclusions.

II Invoicing Choice in Partial Equilibrium

In this section we first discuss the invoicing decision within a partial equilibrium model that is commonly adopted in the invoicing literature.\footnote{The representative papers include Alberto Giovannini (1988), Shabtai Donnenfeld and Itzhak Zilcha (1991), and Richard Friberg (1998). In addition to the basic decision of pricing in exporter's or importer's currency, Friberg (1998) and Martin Johnson and Daniel Pick (1997) examine the optimality of an international vehicle currency. Johnson and Pick also examine exporters from two countries competing in a third market and show that multiple equilibria can occur.} We then extend this approach by allowing firms to take the invoicing choice of other firms into account,
which leads to strategic complementarities.

II.1 An “old-style” partial equilibrium model

Following the standard approach of the partial equilibrium invoicing literature, firms are assumed to face a demand function \( D(p) \), where \( p \) is the price faced by the importer, and a cost function \( C(q) \) of output.\(^8\) Firms set prices before they know the exchange rate, which is the only source of uncertainty. Each firm has to choose whether to set a price \( p^I \) in the importer’s currency or a price \( p^E \) in its own currency (the exporter’s currency). In the former case \( p = p^I \), while in the latter \( p = p^E / S \). Profits are then respectively given by:

\[
\Pi^I = S p^I D(p^I) - C(D(p^I)) \tag{1}
\]

\[
\Pi^E = p^E D(p^E / S) - C(D(p^E / S)) \tag{2}
\]

When setting the price in the importer’s currency, there is uncertainty about the price denominated in the exporter’s currency, \( S p^I \), but there is no demand uncertainty. On the other hand, when setting the price in the exporter’s currency, there is only uncertainty about demand, and thus cost, as the price in the importer’s currency fluctuates with the exchange rate.\(^9\) Firms need to compare the expected utility of profits under the two price setting options: \( EU(\Pi^E) - EU(\Pi^I) \).

A common finding in the literature is that the exporter’s (importer’s) currency is preferred when \( \Pi^E \) is globally convex (concave) with respect to \( S \). This result is entirely independent of the degree of risk-aversion with respect to profits.

Before we discuss the intuition behind this, it is useful to first point out a technical problem when applying this result to any particular set of cost and demand functions. Generally the profit function under exporter’s currency pricing has both concave and convex parts, so that this key result of the literature does not apply. Moreover, the result also does not apply in extensions discussed below, whereby

---

\(^8\)Some papers introduce a distribution sector, so the exporting firm does not sell directly to consumers, but sells to an importing firm. The pricing decision then results from the interactions between the exporter and the importer. See, for example David P. Baron (1976) or John F.O. Bilson (1983). In this paper we do not introduce the distribution sector explicitly.

\(^9\)Thus, in partial equilibrium the currency denomination of trade is similar to fixing the price or the quantity when demand is uncertain. Therefore, the analysis of Paul D. Klemperer and Margaret A. Meyer (1986) can be applied in this context.
profits under importer’s currency pricing are a non-linear function of the exchange rate. We avoid these problems by focusing on uncertainty near \( S = \overline{S} \), a deterministic exchange rate. We will therefore focus on “small” levels of risk, where the variance of \( S \) tends to zero. We can then derive all results about optimal invoicing decisions analytically, even for rather complicated general equilibrium structures. Numerical simulations show that higher levels of risk generally lead to the same results as under small amounts of risk.

We evaluate the impact of a small amount of risk on the optimal pricing strategy by taking the marginal derivative of \( EU(\Pi^E) - EU(\Pi^I) \) with respect to the variance \( \sigma^2 \) of the nominal exchange rate, evaluated at \( \sigma^2 = 0 \). Let \( U' \) and \( U'' \) be the first and second order derivatives of utility with respect to profits and \( \overline{S} = E(S) \). In the Appendix we prove the following Lemma.

**Lemma 1** Let \( \Pi^E(S; x) \) and \( \Pi^I(S; x) \) be two profit functions, where \( x \) is a vector of parameters that depend on \( \sigma^2 \). Assume that \( \partial(\Pi^E - \Pi^I)/\partial x = 0 \) and \( \Pi^E = \Pi^I \) at \( \sigma^2 = 0 \). Holding \( E(S) = \overline{S} \) constant, for any twice differentiable utility function \( U(.) \) we have

\[
\frac{\partial[EU(\Pi^E) - EU(\Pi^I)]}{\partial \sigma^2} = 0.5U'' \left[ \left( \frac{\partial\Pi^E}{\partial S} \right)^2 - \left( \frac{\partial\Pi^I}{\partial S} \right)^2 \right] + 0.5U' \frac{\partial^2(\Pi^E - \Pi^I)}{\partial S^2} \tag{3}
\]

All derivatives are evaluated at \( S = \overline{S} \) and \( \sigma^2 = 0 \).

In our example \( x \) represents the prices that the firm sets. The condition in Lemma 1 is indeed satisfied since the envelope theorem tells us that the first order derivative of profits with respect to the price is zero. We therefore do not have to be concerned about the effect of \( \sigma^2 \) on optimal prices. Prices can simply be held constant at their deterministic levels, where \( p^I = p^E/\overline{S} \). This feature, which also holds for general equilibrium models, simplifies the analysis tremendously.

Under our assumptions, the curvature of profits matters for the optimal pricing decision, but not the curvature of the utility function. For the profit functions (1) and (2) the marginal derivative of profits with respect to the exchange rate is the same, i.e., \( \partial\Pi^E/\partial S = \partial\Pi^I/\partial S \), when firms set prices optimally. Intuitively, the effect of the exchange rate on both profit functions is the same if prices can be immediately adjusted to the exchange rate. But since a change in prices has no first order effect on profits, a change in the exchange rate affects both profit
functions identically even for preset prices. The first term on the right hand side of (3) is then zero, so that the rate of risk aversion does not matter. Since $U'$ > 0, the second term on the right hand side implies that for a marginal increase in the variance of the exchange rate, expected utility is higher under the pricing system with the largest convexity (second order derivative) of profits.

To gain further intuition, we now consider a specific set of constant elasticity demand and cost functions:

$$D(p) = p^{-\mu}$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

$$C(q) = wq^\eta$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

where $\mu$ is the price elasticity of demand and $w$ the wage rate. The cost function is convex for $\eta > 1$. It follows directly from the production function $q = L^{(1/\eta)}$, where $L$ is labor input and the capital stock is held constant in the short run. $\eta$ is therefore the reciprocal of the labor share and will generally be somewhere between 1 and 2.

Applying Lemma 1 to these specific cost and demand functions leads to the following Proposition:

**Proposition 1** Consider a firm exporting to a foreign market, which faces demand and cost functions given by (4) and (5). For small levels of risk as defined in Lemma 1, the firm chooses the following pricing strategy:

- If $\mu(\eta - 1) < 1$, the firm prices in the exporter’s currency
- If $\mu(\eta - 1) > 1$, the firm prices in the importer’s currency

The proposition is illustrated in Figure 3, which plots the two profit functions for marginal deviations of $S$ from $\overline{S}$, holding prices constant at the deterministic level. The derivative of profits with respect to the exchange rate is positive, that is, a depreciation raises profits. As discussed above, the first order derivative is the same whether the firm prices in the importer’s or exporter’s currency. When $\mu(\eta - 1) < 1(> 1)$, profits are convex (concave) when the firm prices in the exporter’s currency and for $S \neq \overline{S}$ are always larger (smaller) than when the firms price in the importer’s currency.

One can also interpret the results in the context of price and demand uncertainty, which have an effect both on the variance and expectation of profits. Since
the first order derivative of profits with respect to the exchange rate is identical under the two invoicing strategies, the first order effect on the variance is the same. This explains why the rate of risk-aversion does not matter. We therefore only have to consider the impact on expected profits. Under importer’s currency pricing the profit function is linear in the exchange rate and expected profits are unaffected. When firms price in the exporter’s currency, two factors affect expected profits. First, when $\eta > 1$ the cost function is convex, implying that a rise in demand raises costs more than a decline in demand lowers costs. The demand volatility that arises when firms price in the exporter’s currency therefore lowers expected profits, making pricing in the importer’s currency more attractive. This effect is stronger the larger $\mu$, which raises demand volatility. On the other hand, the expected level of demand rises since demand is a convex function of the exchange.
rate and is proportional to $S^\mu$. This raises expected profits when pricing in the exporter’s currency. The first effect dominates when $(\eta - 1)\mu > 1$.

II.2 Introducing Strategic Complementarities: The Role of Market Share

We now extend the model to highlight the role of strategic complementarities and market share when multiple domestic firms compete in a foreign market. One can think of the model described so far as that of one firm exporting to a foreign market dominated by foreign firms that set the price in their own currency. Results change, however, if we allow the exporting country to have a large market share. In that case an exporting firm is concerned with the invoicing decisions of other exporters that it is competing with. For now, we assume that all exporting firms are from the same country, leaving the case of multiple exporting countries to the next subsection.

We consider a particular industry in which $N$ exporting firms from the Home country sell in the market of the Foreign country, which has $N^*$ domestic firms. The market share $n = N/(N + N^*)$ of the exporting country becomes a critical element of the analysis. Assuming CES preferences with elasticity $\mu > 1$ among the different products, the demand for goods from firm $j$ is

\[ D(p, P^*) = \frac{1}{N + N^*} \left( \frac{p_j}{P^*} \right)^{-\mu} d^*, \] (6)

where $p_j$ is the price set by the firm measured in the importer’s currency. The industry price index $P^*$ in the Foreign country is given by:

\[ P^* = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N+N^*} \frac{1}{N + N^*} p_i^{1-\mu} \right)^{\frac{1}{(1-\mu)}} \] (7)

$d^*$ is the real level of Foreign spending on goods in the industry, which is equal to the nominal level of spending divided by the industry price index. We hold $d^*$ constant in the partial equilibrium model, but it will be stochastic in the general equilibrium model discussed in the next section. It is assumed that the total number of firms is large enough so that an individual firm does not affect the industry price index.
A fraction \( f \) of Home country firms sets a price \( p^E \) in their own (exporter’s) currency, while a fraction \( 1 - f \) sets a price \( p^I \) in the importer’s currency. Foreign firms set a price \( p^{H*} \) in their own currency, so that our focus is on the invoicing decisions of exporters. The overall industry price index (7) faced by Foreign country consumers is then

\[
P^* = ((1-n)(p^{H*})^{1-\mu} + nf(p^E/S)^{1-\mu} + n(1-f)(p^I)^{1-\mu})^{1/(1-\mu)}
\]  

(8)

The price index depends on the exchange rate to the extent that Home firms price in the exporter’s currency, which leads to a price \( p^E/S \) in the Foreign currency. One can think of the case typically considered in the literature as one where \( n \) is infinitesimally small, so that the industry price index is simply \( p^{H*} \), which is a constant.

We consider two types of equilibria, Nash equilibria and coordination equilibria. Nash equilibria are the outcome of a Nash game, where each firm makes an optimal invoicing decision conditional on the invoicing decisions of all other firms. In general there will be multiple Nash equilibria. The coordination equilibrium is the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium for the exporting country’s firms. Home country firms therefore coordinate on the invoicing decision. This does not mean that there is collusion in price setting, which would violate anti-trust laws in most countries. Each firm still independently chooses its optimal price in the chosen currency.

Nash equilibria can be found by applying Lemma 1 for each firm conditional on the invoicing strategy chosen by other firms. The coordination equilibrium can be found by applying Lemma 1 to the profit functions under the different Nash equilibria to see which one yields the highest expected utility. Applying this to the demand function (6), we obtain Proposition 2.

**Proposition 2** Consider firms exporting to a foreign market, facing cost and demand functions given by (5) and (6). Define \( \bar{n} = 0.5 - 0.5/\mu(\eta - 1) \). For small levels of risk as defined in Lemma 1, firms choose the following pricing strategies:

- If \( \mu(\eta - 1) < 1 \), firms price in the exporter’s currency
- If \( \mu(\eta - 1) > 1 \) and \( n < \bar{n} \) firms price in the importer’s currency
- If \( \mu(\eta - 1) > 1 \) and \( n > \bar{n} \) there are three Nash equilibria: (i) all price in exporter’s currency, (ii) all price in importer’s currency, (iii) a fraction prices
in the exporter’s currency, while the rest prices in the importer’s currency. 
If firms coordinate they prefer to all price in the exporter’s currency if either 
n or the rate of risk-aversion are large enough.

The Proposition implies that market share of the exporting country is crucial 
for the pricing decision. If the market share is small, below the cutoff $\bar{n}$, the 
results are unchanged relative to Proposition 1. In particular, firms price in the 
importer’s currency if demand is sufficiently price elastic. If the market share 
is above the cutoff $\bar{n}$ there are multiple equilibria when $\mu(\eta - 1) > 1$. One of 
these equilibria is one in which all firms price in the exporter’s currency. This is 
the preferred equilibrium when firms coordinate on the invoicing strategy if either 
they are sufficiently risk-averse or their market share is sufficiently large. These 
results imply that firms are more likely to price in the exporter’s currency if their 
country’s market share is large.

The Proposition is further illustrated in Figure 4. For each of the three cases 
of Proposition 2, it graphs $\frac{\partial(EU(\Pi^E) - EU(\Pi^I))}{\partial \sigma^2}$ as a function of $f$. When $\mu(\eta - 1) < 1$ 
the expected utility from profits is highest when pricing in the exporter’s currency, 
independently of the pricing strategy chosen by other firms (line A). When $\mu(\eta - 1) > 1$ firms prefer to price in the importer’s currency when all other exporting 
firms do so as well ($f = 0$, in lines B and C). But the more other firms price in the 
exporter’s currency, the more attractive it becomes for the marginal firm to do so 
as well. This is reflected in the upward sloping line.

The positive slope represents strategic complementarities. In order to under-
stand it, consider the invoicing choice of a marginal firm. The relative price of 
its goods will be less sensitive to the exchange rate, leading to reduced demand 
uncertainty, the more of its competitors choose the same invoicing strategy. If 
the marginal firm prices in the importer’s currency, demand uncertainty will in-
crease when more of its competitors price in the exporter’s currency. Since demand 
uncertainty lowers expected profits when the cost function is convex, it becomes 
increasingly attractive for a marginal firm to price in the exporter’s currency when 
more of its competitors do the same.

The importance of this strategic complementarity depends on the market share 
of the exporting country. When the exporting country has small market share, the 
pricing strategy of competing firms from the exporting country has relatively little 
impact on the overall industry price index. This is illustrated with line B, where the
slope is relatively flat. Firms then still prefer to price in the importer's currency. But when the market share of the exporting country is large, as illustrated with line C, firms prefer to price in the exporter’s currency when all other firms do the same. In the extreme case where \( n = 1 \), so that the exporting country is completely dominant, there is no demand uncertainty at all when all firms price in the exporter’s currency. In the case of line C, there is also a third equilibrium in mixed strategies. However, this equilibrium is unstable and we will ignore it.

If \( n > \bar{n} \) and firms coordinate on the invoicing strategy, they all prefer to price in the exporter’s currency if \( n \) is large enough or if the rate of risk-aversion is high enough. In order to understand this, we will focus here on the case where \( n = 1 \) and either all firms price in the exporter’s currency or all firms price in the importer’s currency. If all firms price in the same currency, there is no demand uncertainty.
Relative prices within the industry are constant. There is still price uncertainty when firms price in the importer’s currency. This does not affect expected profits, but raises the variance of profits. If firms are risk-averse, they then prefer to price in the exporter’s currency.

The central message that pricing in the exporter’s currency is more likely the bigger is the market share of the exporting country is the same for both Nash equilibria and coordination. There is nonetheless an important difference between the two. In the Nash equilibria the invoicing choice of a marginal firm is determined entirely by the effect of the invoicing strategy on expected profits, while in the coordination equilibrium the impact on the variance of profits is critical. Risk-aversion therefore plays a role under coordination, while it does not affect the Nash equilibria. The difference is understood by realizing that with coordination it is no longer the case that $\frac{\partial \Pi^E}{\partial S} = \frac{\partial \Pi^I}{\partial S}$ since we are comparing the invoicing choice of all exporting firms simultaneously rather than that of a marginal firm. The industry price index as a function of the exchange rate is unaffected by the invoicing strategy of a marginal firm, but it is affected by the invoicing choice of all exporters simultaneously under coordination. Under coordination profits are more sensitive to the exchange rate when firms price in the importer’s currency. In terms of Lemma 1, the first term on the right hand side of (3) is no longer equal to zero.

We have also worked out the model when there is a finite number of firms that are each large enough to affect the industry price index. The algebra then becomes considerably more complicated, but the main result of this section, that pricing in the exporter’s currency is more likely the larger the market share of the exporting country, remains unaltered.

II.3 Multiple Exporting Countries

So far we have assumed that there is only one exporting country. We now consider how results are affected when there are multiple countries exporting to a particular market, while otherwise maintaining the partial equilibrium setup of the previous subsection.

Assume that there are $Z$ countries that all sell to a particular market. A fraction $n_i$ of firms selling to this market is from country $i$. In principle there could be as
many as $Z$ currencies, although it is possible that some countries use the same currency. Let $x(i)$ denote the country in whose currency firms from country $i$ invoice their sales. They can price in the exporter’s currency, so that $x(i) = i$, the importer’s currency, or the currency of any other country. We now look at the invoicing decision of a marginal firm from a particular exporting country, say country 1. In the Appendix we use a straightforward generalization of Lemma 1 to prove the following Proposition.

**Proposition 3** Consider a set of firms selling in a particular market with a fraction $n_i$ of firms from country $i$ ($i = 1, \ldots, Z$). Each firm faces cost and demand functions given by (5) and (6). Firms from country $i$ price in the currency of country $x(i)$. Let the exchange rate $S_x$ be the units of country 1’s currency per unit of country $x$’s currency. A marginal firm from country 1 then prefers to invoice in the currency of country $x$ that minimizes

$$\text{var}(S_x) + \mu(\eta - 1)\text{var} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} n_i S_{x(i)} - S_x \right)$$

(9)

It is still the case than when $\mu(\eta - 1)$ is sufficiently small, firms prefer to price in their own (exporter’s) currency since $\text{var}(S_1) = 0$. The larger $\mu(\eta - 1)$, the more firms care about demand risk, which is minimized by invoicing in the currency that is most “similar” to the average invoicing currency chosen by competitors.

There can again be multiple Nash equilibria, even more than before due to the multiple currencies. Rather than consider all Nash equilibria in the general setup just described, we will illustrate with some simple examples two key results that are listed in the following Proposition.

**Proposition 4** Consider a setup where firms from multiple countries sell to a particular foreign market. Each firm faces cost and demand functions given by (5) and (6). Then two general results apply:

1. If none of the countries has a large market share, they are more likely than in a two-country setup to invoice in their own currency. Even for a high demand elasticity $\mu$ they may choose to invoice in their own currency.

2. If a set of countries form a monetary union they are more likely to invoice in their own currency. Imports by the monetary union are also more likely to be invoiced in the union’s currency.
We now discuss two simple examples that illustrate Proposition 4. In a two-country setup at least one country has half of the market share. This no longer needs to be the case with multiple countries selling in a particular market. Consider the extreme case where $Z$ is very large and each country has an equal number of firms, so that $n_i = 1/Z$. To further simplify matters, assume that all bilateral exchange rates have the same variance and correlation $\rho$.\textsuperscript{10} It is then easily verified from Proposition 3 that for $\rho < 0.5$ or $\rho > 0.5$ and $\mu(\eta - 1) < 1/(2\rho - 1)$ there is an equilibrium where all firms price in their own currency. Unless $\rho$ is close to one, firms are happy to price in their own currency even for a high demand elasticity $\mu$. In the two-country model firms from a country with a small market share price only in their own currency when $\mu(\eta - 1) < 1$. In that case firms from the importing country are necessarily dominant if the market share of the exporter is small. Firms from the exporting country are then inclined to price in the importer’s currency to reduce demand risk. In the multi-country example considered here, demand risk will not be reduced by pricing in the importer’s currency if none of the other firms do so.

The second part of Proposition 4 is relevant in the context of EMU.\textsuperscript{11} It suggests that the European Monetary Union (EMU) is likely to lead to more invoicing in euros than in the sum of the currencies it replaced. For illustrative purposes we will again use a simple example. Assume that there are $Z$ European countries that export to one non-European country, say Japan. Each European country has an equal number of firms, accounting for a total market share of $\alpha$. The Japanese firms have a market share of $1 - \alpha$ and price in their own currency in their own market. We will again assume that all bilateral exchange rates have the same variance and correlation $\rho$. We restrict ourselves to two possible equilibria: (i) all European firms invoice in their own currency, or (ii) all European firms invoice in yen. Define $x = 1/\mu(\eta - 1)$. Assume that $\mu(\eta - 1) > 1$ and

\[(1 - x) < 2\alpha < \frac{1}{1 - \rho}(1 - x)\]

\textsuperscript{10}To be more precise, let $S_{ij}$ be the units of country $i$ currency per unit of country $j$ currency. The variance of $S_{ij}$ and the correlation $\rho = \text{corr}(S_{ij}, S_{ik})$ are assumed to be the same for all $i, j, k$.

\textsuperscript{11}See, for example, Philipp Hartmann (1998), for a discussion of the currency denomination of trade in the EMU context.
Using proposition 3 it can then be shown that before EMU all European firms invoice in yen, while after EMU there is a Nash equilibrium where all firms invoice in euro. The latter is the preferred Nash equilibrium under coordination.

The lesson to be drawn from this is that if multiple countries adopt the same currency, the market share that matters is that of the entire currency union, not that of individual countries. The concept of a “country” only has meaning here to the extent that currencies differ. EMU creates a big single currency area, with a larger market share than that of any of the individual countries that make up the currency union. For trade between EMU and the rest of the world we are therefore likely to see more invoicing in euros than pre-EMU invoicing in the currencies that are replaced by the euro. While the example is for European exports, one can easily develop similar examples for European imports.

There is one caveat though. The increased invoicing in euros may not be immediate. In the example above, even after EMU there is still a Nash equilibrium whereby all European firms invoice in yen. Under coordination this is not the preferred invoicing choice, but without coordination history is likely to matter. The model’s implication that history matters may explain for example why in Figure 2 the UK is a bit of an outlier, invoicing more in pounds than can be expected based on market share.

III Invoicing Choice in General Equilibrium

When going from a partial to a general equilibrium setup, the exchange rate is no longer exogenous. The source of uncertainty in the model shifts to a more fundamental set of factors. In this paper we will only consider shocks to money supplies, which are equivalent to money demand shocks. Money is introduced through a cash-in-advance constraint. The per capita money supplies are $M$ and $M^*$ in the Home and Foreign country. The endogeneity of the exchange rate only matters to the extent that other elements of the cost and demand functions are also affected by the monetary shocks. This is indeed the case as both the aggregate demand for goods and wages are affected by the monetary shocks. In the partial equilibrium model these were both held constant. Another change is that we adopt
a representative agent framework. This implies that firms maximize

\[ E \frac{u_c}{P} \prod_{f} \] 

where \( u_c \) is the marginal utility of consumption and \( P \) is the consumer price index. The representative agent framework is chosen mainly for convenience and because it is standard in the new open economy macro general equilibrium literature. It is not critical to the results reported in this section.\(^{12}\) The only critical changes relative to partial equilibrium are the endogenous aggregate demand and wages, both of which are correlated with the exchange rate.

We consider a three-sector model, with two tradables sectors and one non-tradables sector. The motivation for introducing a non-tradables sector is that the sensitivity of the overall consumer price index to the exchange rate becomes a relevant factor. This sensitivity can be significantly overstated, leading to misleading results, if we ignore non-tradables. The motivation for introducing more than one tradables sector is that we would like to explore the role of country size, which by construction plays no role in a partial equilibrium setup. With one tradables sector it is impossible to distinguish between country size and market share in the industry. We therefore introduce two tradables sectors, A and B. In order to make the distinction between country size and market share as sharp as possible, and also simplify the math in the process, we assume that the large Home country is dominant in sector A and the small Foreign country is dominant in sector B. In that case we have four configurations of market dominance and country size: (i) the large country operating in sector A where it is dominant, (ii) the large country operating in sector B where it is not dominant, (iii) the small country operating in sector B where it is dominant, and (iv) the small country operating in sector A where it is not dominant.

Mathematically this is done as follows. Let \( J \) be an integer. The number of firms in the large country in sectors A and B is \( N_A = J^2 \) and \( N_B = 1 \), while the number of firms in the small country is \( N_A^* = 1 \) and \( N_B^* = J \). In both countries the share of firms in the non-tradables sector is \( \alpha_N \) of the total number of firms. The total number of firms is also equal to the total number of consumers, which is \( N \)

\(^{12}\) For example, if we instead assumed that “capitalists” own the firms and consume profits (maximize the expected utility of profits as in the partial equilibrium case), while “workers” consume labor income, the results reported below remain unaltered.
for the large country and \( N^* \) for the small country. We then let \( J \to \infty \), so that the small country is infinitesimally small relative to the large country, while the market shares of the large country in sector A and the small country in sector B are infinitesimally close to 1. From here on we will refer to that simply as market dominance.

Since the optimal currency pricing strategies depend critically on the profit functions of exporters, we will now discuss how the general equilibrium setup changes the demand and cost functions of the Home country. We always refer to the small Foreign country with a * superscript.

### III.1 Demand and Cost

#### III.1.1 Demand

The elasticity of substitution of consumption across sectors is assumed to be one and is therefore smaller than the elasticity \( \mu > 1 \) of substitution among the goods within each sector. The overall consumption index is therefore

\[
c = c_A^{\alpha_A} c_B^{\alpha_B} c_N^{\alpha_N}
\]

where \( c_i \) is a CES index with elasticity \( \mu \) among the output of all firms in sector \( i \). The consumption share \( \alpha_i \) of sector \( i \) is also equal to the fraction of firms operating in sector \( i \). Corresponding to the evidence, the non-tradables consumption share \( \alpha_N \) is assumed to be larger than 0.5.\(^{13}\)

We will focus on demand by Foreign residents faced by Home exporters. The cash-in-advance constraint implies that total nominal income of the Foreign country is equal to the total money supply, which is \( N^* M^* \).\(^{14}\) Letting again the superscripts \( E \) and \( I \) refer to prices set in respectively the exporter’s and importer’s

\(^{13}\)See for example van Wincoop (1999). \( \alpha_N \) is even bigger if we interpret non-tradables more broadly than the traditional services sector, including tradables that are purchased exclusively from domestic producers due to trade costs. The significant home bias in tradables has been well documented.

\(^{14}\)This is the case both when the buyer’s currency and when the seller’s currency is used for payment. The currency in which payment takes place may be the same or different from the currency in which prices are set. In the model these two are entirely separable.
currencies, the demand by Foreign consumers for a Home firm in sector $i$ is

$$D^E_i = \frac{1}{N + N^*} \left( \frac{p^E_i(z)}{SP^*_i} \right)^{-\mu} N^* M^* \frac{M^*}{P^*_i}$$

(11)

when the firm prices in the exporter’s currency, and

$$D^I_i = \frac{1}{N + N^*} \left( \frac{p^I_i(z)}{P^*_i} \right)^{-\mu} N^* M^* \frac{M^*}{P^*_i}$$

(12)

when the firm prices in the importer’s currency. The sectoral price index is

$$P^*_i = \left( (1 - n_i)(p^H_i)^{1-\mu} + n_i f_i (p^E / S)^{1-\mu} + n_i (1 - f_i)(p^I_i)^{1-\mu} \right)^{1/(1-\mu)}$$

(13)

where $n_i$ is the fraction of sector $i$ firms that are from the Home country and $p^H_i$ is the price of domestically sold goods in the Foreign country.

These demand functions and sectoral price indices are the same as in the partial equilibrium model. The only difference is that aggregate real sectoral demand, referred to as $d^*$ in the partial equilibrium model, is now $N^* M^*/P^*_i$ and therefore depends on monetary shocks. The fact that aggregate demand is stochastic is only relevant for invoicing decisions to the extent that it is correlated with the exchange rate. The equilibrium exchange rate can be solved from the Home money market equilibrium condition:

$$N M = \sum_i N_i \left( p^H_i D^H_i + f_i p^E_i D^E_i^* + (1 - f_i) S p^I_i D^I_i^* \right)$$

(14)

In the Appendix we show that for $J \rightarrow \infty$,

$$S = \frac{M}{M^*}$$

(15)

The exchange rate is therefore simply the ratio of the money supplies.

### III.1.2 Cost

The functional form of the cost function also remains unchanged when we move to a general equilibrium setup. To be consistent with the partial equilibrium model we assume that each firm sells exclusively either to the Home market or to the Foreign market. Since the Home market is much larger than the Foreign market, it is assumed that the capital stock of tradables firms that sell to the
Home country is correspondingly larger. To be precise, the production function for a tradables firm $i$ is $L_i(z)^{1/\eta}K_i(z)^{1-1/\eta}$, where $L_i(z)$ is labor input and $K_i(z)$ is the capital stock. The latter is assumed to be 1, $N/(N+N^*)$ and $N^*/(N+N^*)$ respectively for a non-tradables firm, a tradables firm that sells to the Home market and a tradables firm that sells to the Foreign market. These capital stocks are proportional to the level of sales in the deterministic equilibrium. The cost function for all firms then remains the same as (5) if we scale both cost and output by the size of the capital stock.

The only change relative to partial equilibrium is that the wage rate is now generally stochastic. In order to stay as close as possible to the partial equilibrium model, we will first consider a constant nominal wage. A standard approach of introducing nominal wage rigidities is the one discussed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), whereby labor supply is heterogeneous and there are menu costs associated with changing wages. Total labor input is a CES index of heterogeneous labor supplies. Labor is monopolistically supplied and each agent sets the wage rate before uncertainty is resolved. The details do not concern us here and the level at which wages are preset is irrelevant for the results.

When we allow for a flexible wage rate, it is determined by equilibrium in the labor market. With a utility function $u(c, l)$ of consumption and leisure, labor supply follows from the first order condition

$$\frac{w}{P} = \frac{u_l}{u_c}$$

where consumption is $c = M/P$ and $P = P_A^\alpha P_B^\beta P_N^\gamma$ is the consumer price index. With a time endowment of 1, aggregate labor supply is $L = N(1 - l)$. Aggregate labor demand is:

$$L = \sum_i N_i [\{(K_i^H)^{1-\eta}(D_i^H)^{\eta} + f_i(K_i^E)^{1-\eta}(D_i^E)^{\eta}\} + (1 - f_i)(K_i^I)^{1-\eta}(D_i^I)^{\eta}]$$

The superscript $H$ refers to firms selling to the domestic market. For the non-tradables sector there is only domestic demand. The equilibrium wage rate can be solved by equating aggregate labor supply and demand.
III.2 Results

III.2.1 Rigid nominal wages

We again derive the analytical results based on small levels of risk. Assuming that \( M \) and \( M^* \) have the same variance \( \sigma^2 \), we consider the derivative of \( E_{\mathbb{F}}(\Pi^E - \Pi^I) \) with respect to \( \sigma^2 \) at \( \sigma^2 = 0 \).\(^{15}\) Using a generalization of Lemma 1, we can derive the following Proposition when nominal wages are preset.

**Proposition 5** Consider the general equilibrium model with rigid nominal wages. For “small levels of risk”, firms choose the following pricing strategies:

- **If** \((\mu - 1)(\eta - 1) < 1\), **firms price in the exporter’s currency**
- **If** \((\mu - 1)(\eta - 1) > 1\) **and the exporting country has a negligible market share**, firms price in the importer’s currency
- **If** \((\mu - 1)(\eta - 1) > 1\) **and the exporting country is dominant in the market**, there are at least two Nash equilibria: (i) all exporting firms price in exporter’s currency, (ii) all price in importer’s currency. If firms coordinate, they prefer to price in the exporter’s currency when they are risk-averse.

Proposition 5 is qualitatively identical to Proposition 2 in the partial equilibrium model. Market share is still the critical factor in determining the currency denomination of trade. Country size plays no role. The only difference is that the term \( \mu(\eta - 1) \) in Proposition 2 is now replaced by \( (\mu - 1)(\eta - 1) \). The parameter region where all firms invoice in the exporter’s currency has therefore expanded a bit. This is because the demand risk associated with invoicing in the exporter’s currency has been reduced. When firms price in the exporter’s currency a depreciation raises demand. But a depreciation tends to be associated with a decline in the Foreign money supply \( M^* \), which lowers demand. This offsetting effect reduces demand risk, making pricing in the exporter’s currency more attractive.

\(^{15}\)In doing so we hold the correlation between the money supplies constant. One can also hold the ratio of the variances of \( M \) and \( M^* \) constant at a level different from one in order to study the effect of monetary risk on optimal currency invoicing. This is the issue addressed in Devereux and Engel (2001). In this paper we assume that money supplies have the same variance.
III.2.2 Rigid real wages

When we allow for flexible wages, results can change significantly relative to those in Proposition 5. The next Proposition considers the case where real wages are constant. This would for example be the case when the utility function is

$$u(c, l) = \frac{(c + \alpha l)^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma}$$

so that $u_l/u_c$ is a constant.

**Proposition 6** Consider the general equilibrium model with a constant real wage rate. The results of Proposition 5 remain unchanged for the large country. For the small country the cutoff $(\mu - 1)(\eta - 1) > 1$ in Proposition 5 is replaced with $(\mu - 1)(\eta - 1) > 2\alpha N - 1$ when large country firms in sector A price in the exporter’s currency. This makes it more likely that firms from the small country invoice in the importer’s currency.

The intuition for Proposition 6 follows naturally by realizing that the only change relative to Proposition 5 is that the nominal wage is proportional to the overall consumer price index. For the large country, the consumer price index is deterministic as the market is dominated by Home firms that set the price in their own currency. This is not the case for the small country. When exporting firms in the dominant sector of the large country price in the exporter’s currency, the consumer price index of the small country rises when their currency depreciates; thus, the nominal wage increases. This increases the expected cost when firms invoice in the exporter’s currency, since a depreciation raises both the wage rate and demand.

Although theoretically country size matters in the model, we do not think that the channel through which this happens is very important in practice. In the model it only matters to the extent that exchange rate fluctuations affect the overall consumer price index and this immediately affects wages. Most studies, such as Jonathan McCarthy (2000), find that in industrialized countries exchange rate fluctuations have a relatively small effect on the overall consumer price index. Moreover, only in countries with very high inflation rates does unexpected inflation affect wages without much delay. Aggregate invoicing data also suggest that country size does not play a significant role. Figure 5 compares country size
(log of GDP) to the percent of exports invoiced in the exporter’s currency for the same seven industrialized countries as in Figures 1 and 2. Invoicing appears to be less correlated with country size than with market share. In particular, the second largest country of the world, Japan, invoices the least of all countries in its own currency.

III.2.3 Stochastic real wages

The next step is to allow for volatility in real wages. Here our main result is in the form of a warning. Allowing for strongly pro-cyclical or anti-cyclical real wages can lead to invoicing results that are starkly at odds with the evidence. This can best be illustrated with a simple example. Assume that preferences take the following form:

\[ u(c, l) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \alpha l \]  

(18)
For the large country the real wage rate then becomes proportional to $M^\gamma$. $\gamma$ is therefore a measure of the degree of pro-cyclicality of real wages. It can be shown that when the cyclicality parameter $\gamma$ is larger than $\mu$, and $\eta < 2$, all firms in both sectors in both countries price in the importer’s currency.\footnote{More generally, the following equilibria apply to firms from the large country. When $(\eta - 1)(\mu - 1) < 1 - \gamma$ all firms price in the exporter’s currency. When $(\eta - 1)(\mu - 1) < \gamma - 1$ all firms in all countries price in the importer’s currency. When $(\eta - 1)(\mu - 1)$ is larger than both $1 - \gamma$ and $\gamma - 1$, all firms in non-dominant sectors price in the importer’s currency, while firms in the dominant sectors price in the exporter’s currency.} An increase in the money supply raises the wage rate, but also leads to a depreciation, which increases demand when firms invoice in the exporter’s currency. The positive correlation between wages and demand when firms invoice in the exporter’s currency increases expected costs and lowers expected profits.

As has been extensively documented, real wages are neither strongly pro-cyclical nor strongly anti-cyclical. Allowing for strong cyclicality in real wages therefore contradicts most evidence. The fact that for strongly cyclical real wages one can easily get invoicing results that contradict the data should therefore not be much of a concern. If anything, it tells us that one has to be careful in choosing parameter values of a new open economy macro model when deriving the optimal invoicing results. It is easy to choose parameter values that lead to misleading results. For example, with preferences such as (18), the parameter $\gamma$ plays a dual role, determining both the rate of relative risk-aversion and the cyclicality of real wages.\footnote{In Devereux and Engel (2001), $\gamma$ plays the additional role of money demand elasticity. Money demand is modeled through money in the utility function by augmenting the preferences in (18) with the log of the real money supply. They additionally assume $\eta = 1$. In that case neither country size, nor market share matter. The level of $\mu$ also does not affect the equilibrium invoicing strategies.}

### III.3 Complete Asset Markets

Throughout the paper we have assumed that no assets are traded internationally. We now briefly discuss the implications of allowing for complete asset markets, so that there is full risk-sharing across the two countries. Assuming that nominal wages are rigid, the only impact of risk-sharing on the profit functions is through its effect on aggregate demand. Risk-sharing does not qualitatively alter the main
results of the paper, but it makes invoicing in the importer’s currency more likely. The Appendix describes the algebraic details. Here we only discuss the intuition.

In our small-large country model, only the small country is able to share risk in a way that affects its per capita consumption. Although that is a special case, it can be verified that the direction in which risk-sharing affects the results is the same when we allow for two equally sized countries that both benefit from risk-sharing. The Nash equilibria for Foreign country firms remain the same as in Proposition 5. Since per capita consumption of the Home country remains unchanged, the profit functions of Foreign country exporters remain unchanged. The profit functions of Home country exporters change as aggregate demand by Foreign country residents is no longer proportional to $M^*$. Aggregate demand in general depends positively on both $M^*$ and $M$ as a result of the risk-sharing.

We saw in Proposition 5 that in the case of no risk-sharing, pricing in the exporter’s currency became somewhat more likely than in the partial equilibrium model. Demand risk is weakened when firms price in the exporter’s currency since the rise in demand as a result of a depreciation tends to be offset by a decline in aggregate Foreign demand as a result of a drop in $M^*$. With full risk-sharing, Foreign demand depends positively on both Home and Foreign money supplies, so that the offsetting effect is smaller (and could even go the other way). Pricing in the exporter’s currency therefore becomes less attractive.

IV Conclusions

The recent new open economy macroeconomics literature has shown that the currency in which prices are set has significant implications for trade flows, capital flows, nominal and real exchange rates, as well as optimal monetary and exchange rate policies. Since one of the main objectives of the recent literature is to bring microfoundations to macroeconomic analysis, it is natural to consider the optimal pricing strategy of firms within the context of this literature. Our main approach has been to build intuition by starting from a simpler partial equilibrium framework, which has also allowed us to connect the older partial equilibrium literature on currency invoicing with the more modern general equilibrium new open economy macro models.

We find that the two main factors determining the invoicing choice are market
share and differentiation of goods. The higher the market share of an exporting country, and the more differentiated its goods, the more likely its exporters will price in the exporter’s currency. In the introduction we briefly discussed some evidence consistent with these findings. There is clearly a need for further empirical work to confirm that these are critical factors. The model also implies that greater country size makes invoicing in the exporter’s currency more likely, although we have argued that the empirical relevance of the mechanism is likely to be limited. Finally, we found that when drawing conclusions from new open economy macro models about invoicing one needs to be careful in choosing parameters. In particular, parameter choices that lead to strongly cyclical real wages can lead to misleading results.

There are two important directions for future research. First, since the focus of this paper has been on positive economics (understanding currency invoicing), we have ignored the normative implications. In previous work (Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000)) we have addressed the welfare implications of exchange rate regimes holding fixed the invoicing choice of firms. It is clear though that the invoicing choice will be affected by monetary and exchange rate policies, which needs to be taken into account. A second direction for research involves the distinction between trade prices and retail prices. Several authors have emphasized the fact that exchange rate changes are passed on to a larger extent to import prices than to consumer prices. In this paper we have made no distinction between the two. Future research needs to better understand the role of the distribution sector as an intermediary.
References


Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1
Take the two profit functions $\Pi^E(S; x)$ and $\Pi^I(S; x)$ considered in the Lemma. We examine small levels of risk around $\bar{S} = E(S)$. Since $\partial(\Pi^E - \Pi^I)/\partial x = 0$ we only need to consider profits as a function of $S$, holding $x$ constant at its deterministic level. It is assumed that $\Pi^E(\bar{S}) = \Pi^I(\bar{S})$. Let $f(S) = U(\Pi^E) - U(\Pi^I)$. We have $f(\bar{S}) = 0$ and:

$$f_S = U'(\Pi^E) \frac{\partial \Pi^E}{\partial S} - U'(\Pi^I) \frac{\partial \Pi^I}{\partial S}$$

and

$$f_{SS}(S) = U'' \left[ \left( \frac{\partial \Pi^E}{\partial S} \right)^2 - \left( \frac{\partial \Pi^I}{\partial S} \right)^2 \right] + U' \left[ \frac{\partial^2 \Pi^E}{\partial S^2} - \frac{\partial^2 \Pi^I}{\partial S^2} \right]$$

where $U''$ and $U'$ are evaluated at $\bar{S}$.

Then take a second-order Taylor expansion around $\bar{S}$:

$$f(S) = f(\bar{S}) + f_S(\bar{S})(S - \bar{S}) + \frac{1}{2} f_{SS}(\bar{S})(S - \bar{S})^2$$

Its expected value is:

$$Ef(S) = \frac{1}{2} f_{SS}(\bar{S})\sigma^2$$

Using the equation for $f_{SS}(\bar{S})$ and assuming that $\bar{S}$ is constant gives Lemma 1. Higher order terms in the Taylor expansion do not matter. In order to see this, assume that $S - \bar{S}$ is equal to $\sigma y$, where $y$ has expectation 0, variance 1 and its distribution does not depend on $\sigma$ or, even weaker, the derivative of $E y^n$ ($n > 2$) with respect to $\sigma$ (evaluated at $\sigma = 0$) is finite. The derivative of $E(S - \bar{S})^n = \sigma^n E(y^n)$ with respect to $\sigma^2$ is then zero for $n > 2$ when evaluated at $\sigma = 0$.

Proof of Proposition 1

¿From (1), (2), (4), and (5), the firm’s profit functions are:

$$\Pi^I = S \cdot (p^I)^{1-\mu} - w \cdot (p^I)^{-\eta\mu} \quad (19)$$

$$\Pi^E = S^{\mu} \cdot (p^E)^{1-\mu} - w \cdot S^{\eta\mu} \cdot (p^E)^{-\eta\mu} \quad (20)$$

First, notice that for $\sigma^2 = 0$ and $E(S) = \bar{S} = 1$, the optimal price set by the firm is the same, i.e., $p^E = p^I \equiv \bar{p}$, where:

$$(\mu - 1)\bar{p}^{1-\mu} = \eta w \bar{p}^{-\eta\mu} \quad (21)$$
Then, Lemma 1 applies since $\Pi^E(1; x) = \Pi^I(1; x)$ and $\partial(\Pi^E - \Pi^I)/\partial x = 0$, where $x = (p^E, p^I, w)$. Then it can be shown that:

$$\frac{\partial [EU(\Pi^E) - EU(\Pi^I)]}{\partial \sigma^2} = 0.5U''\frac{\partial^2 \Pi^E}{\partial S^2} = 0.5U''(\mu - 1)\overline{p}^{1-\mu} [1 - \mu(\eta - 1)]$$

whose sign depends on the sign of $1 - \mu(\eta - 1)$.

**Proof of Proposition 2**

With strategic complementarities, we first examine the incentives of a marginal firm given the behavior of the other firms. Then we determine the Nash equilibrium such that the marginal firm does not deviate. In the coordination case, all firms take the same action simultaneously. Without loss of generality we set $d^*/(N + N^*) = 1$. Using (6), profits of firm $i$ are:

$$\Pi^I_i = S \cdot p^I_i \cdot \left(\frac{p^I_i}{P^*}\right)^{-\mu} - w \cdot \left(\frac{p^I_i}{P^*}\right)^{-\eta\mu}$$

(22)

$$\Pi^E_i = S^\mu \cdot p^E_i \cdot \left(\frac{p^E_i}{P^*}\right)^{-\mu} - w \cdot S^\eta \cdot \left(\frac{p^E_i}{P^*}\right)^{-\eta\mu}$$

(23)

where $P^*$ is given by (8). First notice that for $\sigma^2 = 0$ and $S = \overline{S} = 1$, all firms choose the same price: $p^H = p^E = p^I \equiv \overline{p}$. This implies that in the deterministic equilibrium $P^* = \overline{p}$. The optimal price is given by:

$$(\mu - 1)\overline{p} = \eta\mu w$$

(24)

In computing the derivatives of profits, the main difference with Proposition 1 is that $P^*$ depends on $S$. From (8), we have:

$$\frac{\partial P^*}{\partial S} = -\overline{p}nfS^{\mu-2} \left[1 - n + nfS^{\mu-1} + n(1 - f)\right]^{-\mu\nu}$$

which evaluated at $S = \overline{S} = 1$ gives $\partial P^*/\partial S = -nf\overline{p}$. Then we can show that:

$$\frac{\partial [EU(\Pi^E) - EU(\Pi^I)]}{\partial \sigma^2} = U''(\mu - 1)\frac{\overline{p}}{2} [1 - \mu(\eta - 1)(1 - 2fn)]$$

The sign of this expression depends on the sign of $1 - \mu(\eta - 1)(1 - 2fn)$. There can be three types of Nash equilibria:

- $f = 0$ and $EU(\Pi^E) < EU(\Pi^I)$. In this case, all firms price in the importer’s currency and the marginal firm still prefers pricing in the importer’s currency.
\item $f = 1$ and $EU(\Pi^E) > EU(\Pi^I)$. All firms price in their own currency and the marginal firm prefers pricing in its own currency.

\item $EU(\Pi^E) = EU(\Pi^I)$ and $0 < f < 1$. This is a mixed equilibrium, where a proportion $f$ of firms prices in their own currency and the marginal firm is indifferent as to it pricing strategy.

There is an equilibrium where all firms price in the importer’s currency ($f = 0$) when $\mu(\eta - 1) > 1$. There is an equilibrium where all firms price in the exporter’s currency ($f = 1$) when either $n > \bar{n}$ or $n < \bar{n}$ and $\mu(\eta - 1) < 1$. When $n > \bar{n}$ there is also a mixed equilibrium with $0 < f < 1$.

When firms coordinate, they consider their best pricing strategy given that all the others do the same. Thus, if they price in their own currency, they assume $f = 1$ and thus $\partial P^*/\partial S = -n\bar{p}$; when they price in the importer’s currency, they assume $f = 0$ and thus $\partial P^*/\partial S = 0$. This implies:

\[
\frac{\partial \left[EU(\Pi^E) - EU(\Pi^I)\right]}{\partial \sigma^2} = 0.5U' \cdot \bar{p}(1 - n)\left\{n\mu + (1 - n)(\mu - 1)(1 - \mu(\eta - 1))\right\}
\]

\[-0.5U''\bar{p}^2 n(2 - n)\]

For $n$ close to one or $n > 0$ and $U''$ sufficiently large, this expression is positive, so firms prefer to price in the exporter’s currency.

**Proof of Proposition 3**

Assume there are $Z$ countries and that the price of all firms is equal to one. We consider the currency pricing decision of a marginal firm in country 1 exporting to country 2. Country 1 exporters will compare profits when they price in their own currency $\Pi^1$ or in any other currency $\Pi^x$. Let $S_j$ be the exchange rate of country $j$ with respect to country 1, i.e., the quantity of country 1 currency per one unit of country $j$ currency. Following the same argument as before, we can evaluate profits at the deterministic prices $\bar{p} = \eta \mu w / (\mu - 1)$. Profits can be written as:

\[
\Pi^x = S_x \bar{p} \left(S_x \bar{p} / \bar{P}\right)^{-\mu} - w \left(\bar{p} S_x / \bar{P}\right)^{-\eta \mu}
\]

\[
\Pi^1 = \left(\bar{p} / \bar{P}\right)^{-\mu} - w(\bar{p} / \bar{P})^{-\eta \mu}
\]

34
where \( \bar{P} \) is the price index in country 2 but expressed in country 1 currency (\( \bar{P} = S_2P_2 \)):

\[
\bar{P}^{1-\mu} = \bar{p}^{1-\mu} \sum_{i=1}^{Z} n_i S_{x(i)}^{1-\mu}.
\]

Since profits now depend on multiple exchange rates, we apply a generalization of Lemma 1 with \( S \) replaced by multiple exchange rates. If we are interested in small amounts of risk, as defined in Lemma 1, it is sufficient to look at a second order Taylor approximation of \( f(S_x, S_{x(1)}, \ldots, S_{x(Z)}) = U(\Pi^x) - U(\Pi^1) \). This yields:

\[
E(f) = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial S_x^2} \text{var}(S_x) + \sum_{i=1}^{Z} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial S_x \partial S_{x(i)}} \text{cov}(S_x, S_{x(i)})
\]  

(25)

Evaluating at the deterministic equilibrium we have:

\[
\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial S_x^2} = U'(-1)\bar{p}(\mu - \eta\mu - 1)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial S_x \partial S_{x(i)}} = U'(-1)\bar{p}\mu(-1)\eta
\]

By substituting the above expressions into (25) we get:

\[
\frac{2E(f)}{U''(\mu)} = (\mu - \eta\mu - 1)\text{var}(S_x) + 2\sum_{i=1}^{Z} \mu(\eta - 1)n_i\text{cov}(S_x, S_{x(i)})
\]

The firms chooses to price in the currency \( x \) for which this expression is largest, which is equivalent to choosing the currency \( x \) that minimizes the expression (9) in Proposition 3.

**Proof of Proposition 5**

In general equilibrium profits also depend on \( M \) and \( M^* \) and firms maximize \( E U_\pi \Pi/P \) instead of \( E U(\Pi/P) \). We prove an extension of Lemma 1, where \( \sigma^2 \) represents the variance of money supplies and \( \rho \) their correlation and where \( \gamma \) is the degree of relative risk aversion:

**Lemma 2** Let \( \Pi^E(S, M, M^*; x) \) and \( \Pi^I(S, M, M^*; x) \) be two profit functions, where \( x(\sigma^2) \) is a vector of parameters that depend on \( \sigma^2 \) and \( S = M/M^* \). Assume that \( \partial(\Pi^E - \Pi^I)/\partial x = 0, \Pi^E(\bar{S}, M, M^*; x(0)) = \Pi^I(\bar{S}, M, M^*; x(0)) \forall M, M^* \), and
The vector \( \Pi^E(S, \bar{M}, \bar{M}; x) = \Pi^I(S, \bar{M}, \bar{M}; x) \). A bar refers to \( \sigma^2 = 0 \). Let \( U_c(M/P(S)) \) be the marginal utility with \( \gamma = -U_{cc} \cdot c/U_c \). Holding \( E(M) = E(M^*) = M \) constant, for any twice differentiable utility function \( U(.) \) we have

\[
\frac{\partial E_U}{\partial \sigma^2}(\Pi^E - \Pi^I) = (1 - \rho) \frac{U_c}{P} \left\{ \frac{\partial^2(\Pi^E - \Pi^I)}{\partial S^2} + \frac{\partial^2(\Pi^E - \Pi^I)}{\partial S \partial M} - \frac{\partial^2(\Pi^E - \Pi^I)}{\partial S \partial M^*} \right\} + (1 - \rho) \frac{U_c}{P} \left( 1 - \frac{2 \partial P}{P \partial S} - \gamma (1 - \frac{2 \partial P}{P \partial S}) \right) \frac{\partial(\Pi^E - \Pi^I)}{\partial S}
\]

All derivatives are evaluated at \( S = \bar{S}, M = \bar{M}, M^* = \bar{M} \), and \( x = x(0) \).

**Proof:** Define \( f(S, M, M^*) = \frac{U}{P}(\Pi^E - \Pi^I) \). Since \( S = M/M^* \) we can write this as a function of \( M \) and \( M^* \). Similarly to the proof of Lemma 1, we take a second order Taylor expansion of \( f \) and take the expectation. This gives:

\[
\frac{\partial E f(S, M, M^*)}{\partial \sigma^2} = (1 - \rho) [f_{SS} + f_{SM} - f_{SM^*} + f_S] + \frac{1}{2} [f_{MM} + f_{M^* M^*} + 2 \rho f_{MM^*}]
\]

Since \( \Pi^E(\bar{S}, M, M^*, x(0)) = \Pi^I(\bar{S}, M, M^*, x(0)) \) \( \forall M, M^* \), the last term is equal to zero. We then compute \( f_{SS}, f_{SM}, f_{SM^*}, \) and \( f_S \), regroup terms and use the definition of \( \gamma \) to get Lemma 2.

Omitting the firm’s subscript, a Home exporting firm’s profits in sector \( j \) (scaled by the capital stock \( N^*/(N + N^*) \)) are given by:

\[
\Pi^I = (\rho_j^I/P_j^I)^{1-\mu} M^* - w (\rho_j^I/P_j^*)^{-\eta \mu} (M^*/P_j^*)^{-\eta}
\]

\[
\Pi^E = (\rho_j^E/P_j)^{1-\mu} S^\mu M^* - w S^{\eta \mu} (\rho_j^E/P_j^*)^{-\eta \mu} (M^*/P_j^*)^{-\eta}
\]

The vector \( x \) in Lemma 2 consists of all prices that enter directly into the profit functions, or indirectly through the sectoral price indices \( P_j^* \). Since the marginal derivative of \( \Pi^E - \Pi^I \) with respect to these prices is 0, we can apply Lemma 2 by setting all prices equal to their deterministic level \( \bar{p} \), defined as

\[
\frac{w}{\bar{p}} = \frac{\mu - 1}{\eta \mu}
\]

(26)

Here we have without loss of generality set \( \bar{M} = 1 \). The profit differential is then:

\[
\Pi^E - \Pi^I = \left( \frac{\bar{p}}{P_j^*} \right)^{1-\mu} M^*(S^\mu - S) - \frac{\mu - 1}{\eta \mu} \left( \frac{\bar{p}}{P_j^*} \right)^{\eta \mu} M^* (S^{\eta \mu} - 1)
\]

36
The strategy is to apply Lemma 2 in the two industries for firms in both countries under various assumptions about what other firms do. We then look at the Nash equilibria, where the optimal behavior of a marginal firm is consistent with the industry’s behavior. Both the behavior of Home and Foreign firms matter. The various cases differ with respect to the sensitivity of the industry price index \( P_j^* \) as given by (13). Consider for example sector A. In this sector:

\[
P_A^* = [(1 - n_A)\bar{p}^{1-\mu} + n_A f_A (\bar{p}/S)^{1-\mu} + n_A (1 - f_A) \bar{p}^{1-\mu}]^{1/(1-\mu)} \quad (27)
\]

For Home country firms in sector A, \( n_A = 1 \) so that \( P_A^* = \bar{p} \) for \( f_A = 0 \) and \( P_A^* = \bar{p}/S \) for \( f_A = 1 \), where \( f_A \) is the proportion of Home country firms in sector A pricing in their own currency. Notice that the pricing of Foreign firms in this sector is irrelevant in this case. For Home country firms in sector B, we simply have \( P_B^* = \bar{p} \) independently of what other firms do.

Taking second order derivatives with respect to \( S \) and \( M^* \) and applying Lemma 2 gives (it can be checked that \( \frac{\partial \pi_I}{\partial S} = \frac{\partial \pi_E}{\partial S} \)):

\[
\frac{\partial E_U \pi^l}{\partial \sigma^2} (\pi^E - \pi^I) = (1 - \rho) \frac{U_c}{P} (\mu - 1) ((1 - (\mu - 1)(\eta - 1)) \text{ for } P_j^* = \bar{p} \quad (28)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial E_U \pi^l}{\partial \sigma^2} (\pi^E - \pi^I) = (1 - \rho) \frac{U_c}{P} (\mu - 1) ((1 + (\mu - 1)(\eta - 1)) \text{ for } P_j^* = \bar{p}/S \quad (29)
\]

The second condition is always positive. Hence pricing in the firm’s own currency is always an equilibrium if the firm is in a ‘dominant’ sector. The other cases depend on the sign of \( 1 - (\mu - 1)(\eta - 1) \). It is then easy to derive the various cases of Proposition 5. The results for the small Foreign country are identical since the profit functions are not affected by country size.

When firms coordinate, a marginal firm assumes that other firms do the same. Thus, when firms are in a dominant sector, \( P_j^* = \bar{p}/S \) when firms price in their own currency and \( P_j^* = \bar{p} \) when firms price in the importer’s currency. Profits (still scaled by the capital stock) become:

\[
\pi^I = SM^* - w\bar{p}^{-\eta} M^{*\eta}
\]

\[
\pi^E = SM^* - w\bar{p}^{-\eta} M^{*\eta} S^\eta
\]

Lemma 2 implies:

\[
\frac{\partial E_U \pi^l}{\partial \sigma^2} (\pi^E - \pi^I) = (1 - \rho) \frac{U_c}{P} \frac{\mu - 1}{\mu} \left( 2 \frac{\partial P}{P} \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial S} + \gamma (1 - \frac{2}{P} \frac{\partial P}{\partial S}) \right) \quad (30)
\]
For the small Foreign country the expression is exactly the same, with a star added to all the variables. When the country is large, or when the country is small and the large country prices in the importer’s currency, the derivative of the price index with respect to the exchange rate is zero. (30) is then positive and firms prefer to price in the exporter’s currency. When the country is small and the large country prices in its own currency, \( \frac{\partial P^*/\partial S^*}{\partial S^*} = \bar{p}(1 - \alpha_N) \), where \( S^* = 1/S \). The Foreign country version of (30) then remains positive under our assumption that \( \alpha_N > 0.5 \).

**Proof of Proposition 6**
The only difference relative to Proposition 5 is that now the nominal wage rate is proportional to the consumer price index rather than being a constant. For the large Home country the consumer price index is a constant, so nothing changes relative to Proposition 5. We therefore focus on the small country. When \( f_A = 0 \), so that the dominant sector of the Home country prices in the importer’s currency, the price index of the Foreign country is constant as well, so again the results remain the same as in Proposition 5. We therefore only have to consider the invoicing choice in the Foreign country conditional on \( f_A = 1 \). Let \( w^* = P^* \bar{w} \), where \( \bar{w} \) is the constant real wage rate. Evaluated at deterministic prices, \( P^* = \bar{p} \) \( (S^*)^{1-\alpha_N} \), where \( S^* = 1/S \). The profit differential of Foreign exporters in sector \( j \), scaled by the capital stock \( N/(N + N^*) \), is:

\[
\Pi^E - \Pi^I = \left( \frac{\bar{p}}{P_j} \right)^{1-\mu} M[(S^*)^{\eta} - S^*] - P^* \bar{w} \left( \frac{\bar{p}}{P_j} \right)^{-\eta} \left( \frac{M}{P_j} \right)^{\eta} [(S^*)^{\eta} - 1]
\]

\( P_A = \bar{p} \), while \( P_B = \bar{p} \) if \( f_B^* = 0 \) and \( P_B = \bar{p}/S^* \) if \( f_B^* = 1 \). Using Lemma 2, after some algebra we get the following expression for \( \frac{\partial E U^{U^E}}{\partial \tau^2} (\Pi^E - \Pi^I) / \partial \sigma^2 \):

\[
(1 - \rho) \frac{U_c^*}{P^*} (\mu - 1) \left( 2\alpha_N - 1 - (\eta - 1)(\mu - 1) \right) \text{ if } P_j = \bar{p} \quad (31)
\]

\[
(1 - \rho) \frac{U_c^*}{P^*} (\mu + 1) \left( 2\alpha_N - 1 + (\eta - 1)(\mu - 1) \right) \text{ if } P_j = \frac{\bar{p}}{S^*} \quad (32)
\]

Since \( \alpha_N > 0.5 \), it is always an equilibrium for Foreign firms in the dominant sector B to price in the exporter’s currency. The other cases depend on the sign of \( 2\alpha_N - 1 - (\eta - 1)(\mu - 1) \). It is immediately clear that the outcome is the same as that in Proposition 5, with the cutoff changing from \( (\eta - 1)(\mu - 1) > 1 \) to \( (\eta - 1)(\mu - 1) > 2\alpha_N - 1 \).
When firms in the dominant sector B of the Foreign country coordinate, $P_B = \bar{p}/S^*$ when they price in their own currency, while $P_B = \bar{p}$ when they price in the importer’s currency. The profit differential is then

$$
\Pi_E^* - \Pi^I = \alpha \bar{p}^{1-\eta} M^{\eta} [(S^*)^{1-\alpha_N} - (S^*)^{\eta+1-\alpha_N}]
$$

Applying Lemma 2, we get

$$
\frac{\partial E_U^c (\Pi_E^* - \Pi^I)}{\partial \sigma^2} = \frac{\mu - 1}{\mu} (1 - \rho) U_c^* \gamma (2 \alpha_N - 1)
$$

This expression is always positive since we assumed that $\alpha_N > 0.5$, implying that Foreign country firms in sector B prefer to price in the exporter’s currency.

**Deriving the equilibrium exchange rate**

We give a sketch of the proof that $S = M/M^*$. We use the money market equilibrium condition (14), with the following demand equations. For non-tradables $D_N^H = M$. For demand in the tradables sectors A and B:

$$
D_A^H = \frac{N}{N + N^*} \left( \frac{p_A^H}{P_A} \right)^{-\mu} \frac{M}{P_A}
$$

$$
D_A^E = \frac{N^*}{N + N^*} \left( \frac{p_A^E}{SP_A^*} \right)^{-\mu} \frac{M^*}{P_A^*}
$$

$$
D_B^I = \frac{N}{N + N^*} \left( \frac{p_B^I}{P_B} \right)^{-\mu} \frac{M^*}{P_B}
$$

After substituting the demand equations into the money market equilibrium condition (14), we (i) collect terms proportional to $M$ and terms proportional to $M^*$, (ii) substitute the Home country equivalent of (13) for $P_A^{1-\mu}$, and (iii) divide by $N^*$. This yields the following equation:

$$
(f_A^* (SP_A^E/P_A)^{1-\mu} + (1 - f_A^*) (p_A^I/P_A)^{1-\mu}) \frac{N_A^*}{N + N^*} \frac{N_A + N^* + N_B + N_B^* M N}{N_A + N_A^*} \frac{N_A + N_A^* + N_B + N_B^* M N}{N_A + N_A^*} - (p_B^H/P_B)^{1-\mu} \frac{N_B}{N + N^*} \frac{M N}{N^*}
$$

$$
= \sum_{i=A,B} \frac{N_i}{N + N^*} \left( f_i (p_i^E/SP_i^*)^{1-\mu} + (1 - f_i) (p_i^I/P_i^*)^{1-\mu} \right) S M^*
$$

39
We then let $J \to \infty$, using $N_A = J^2$, $N_B = 1$, $N = (J^2 + 1)/(1 - \alpha_N)$, $N_A^* = 1$, $N_B^* = J$, $N^* = (J + 1)/(1 - \alpha_N)$. We also use that for $J \to \infty$, $P_A \to p_A^H$ and $(P_A^*)^{1-\mu} \to f_A(p_A^H/S)^{1-\mu} + (1 - f_A)(p_A^H)^{1-\mu}$. It then follows that for $J \to \infty$, $S = M/M^*$.

**Complete Asset Markets**

With complete markets, Home and Foreign country residents make state contingent transfers. Let $\theta$ be the per capita transfer paid by Foreign residents in foreign currency. Foreign nominal per capita income is then $M^* - \theta$, while for Home it is $M + \theta SN^*/N$. Since $N^*/N \to 0$, Home income and consumption are not affected by the transfer, i.e., $c = M/\overline{p}$. Moreover, it is easily checked that we still have $S = M/M^*$.

We consider the case of rigid nominal wages and a separable utility function (18), so that $U_c = c^{-\gamma}$. With perfect risk sharing, the ratio of marginal utilities is equal to the real exchange rate, i.e., $U_c/U_c^* = P/SP^*$. To save space, we present the case where $\gamma \to \infty$ (the more general case is easily derived and gives qualitatively similar results). Full risk-sharing then implies $c = c^*$, so that $c^* = M/\overline{p}$.

The profit differential (scaled by the capital stock) can be written as:

$$\Pi^E - \Pi^I = \left(\frac{\overline{p}}{P_j^*}\right)^{1-\mu} (P^*c^*)(S^\mu - S) - \frac{\mu - 1}{\eta \mu} \left(\frac{\overline{p}}{P_j^*}\right)^{\eta-\eta \mu} (P^*c^*)^\eta (S^{\eta \mu} - 1)$$

When $f_A = 0$, $P^*c^* = \overline{p}M/\overline{p} = M$. Moreover, $P_j^* = \overline{p}$, so that:

$$\Pi^E - \Pi^I = M(S^\mu - S) - \frac{\mu - 1}{\eta \mu} M^{\eta} (S^{\eta \mu} - 1)$$

In this case, using Lemma 2 we find that

$$\frac{\partial E[U^E(\Pi^E - \Pi^I)]}{\partial \sigma^2} = (1 - \rho) \frac{U_c}{P} (\mu - 1)((1 - (\mu + 1)(\eta - 1)$$

Compared to (28), this is more likely to be negative, so that the equilibrium with $f_A = 0$ (importer’s currency) is more likely to hold.

When $f_A = 1$, $P^* = \overline{p}(1/S)^{1-\alpha_N}$ so that $P^*c^* = M^{\alpha_N}(M^*)^{1-\alpha_N}$. Moreover, $P_A^* = \overline{p}/S$ and $P_B^* = \overline{p}$. In sector A the profit differential is

$$\Pi^E - \Pi^I = M^{\alpha_N} M^{s1-\alpha_N} (S - S^{2-\mu}) - \frac{\mu - 1}{\eta \mu} (M^{\alpha_N} M^{s1-\alpha_N})^\eta (S^{\eta} - S^{\eta \mu})$$
which implies:

\[
\frac{\partial E_U^E (\Pi^E - \Pi^I)}{\partial \sigma^2} = (1 - \rho) \frac{U_c}{F} (\mu - 1) ((1 + (\mu - 1 - 2\alpha_N)(\eta - 1))
\]

Compared to (29) this expression is more likely to be negative, so that pricing in the exporter’s currency is less likely to be an equilibrium. Finally, it can be easily checked that a similar result holds for sector B.