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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ELITES IN SWITZERLAND

Personal interchange, interactional relations and structural homology

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ABSTRACT: As a legacy of the early stages of its state building process, Switzerland continues to be characterised by a cohesive elite whose members simultaneously occupy political and economic positions. Whereas sectoral analyses of the economic or political elite are widespread, few researchers have scrutinised the connections between business and politics. Therefore, this paper focuses on the linkages between the economic and political fields. Based on a joint multiple correspondence analysis of the CEOs and board members of the 110 largest Swiss companies in 2000 and 256 parliamentary members, we examine the interactional and objective relations between the fields through an analysis of personal interchange, participation in meeting places and structural homology of educational capital. It appears that the connections between elites are cumulative: in each field, the dominant faction shares a background in law or engineering, participates in meeting places, and personally moves between the fields. Reversely, the dominated, which come from a rather heterogeneous educational background, are excluded from interactional relations and moves between the two fields. That the two forms of elite coordination coincide and reinforce each other could be typical for a small country with little differentiated fields, where elite members quickly get to know each other and can easily meet on a regular basis.

Key words: economic elites; political elites; fields; multiple correspondence analysis

1. Introduction

Switzerland is considered to be ruled by a close-knit elite that simultaneously embraces political, economic and military positions. As a

legacy of the early phase of the Swiss federal state, both the Swiss civil service and Swiss companies were thought to be dominated by a 'liberal' elite that holds degrees in law, ranks high in the army, and is linked through institutions of mediation and consensus building. Still today, the close interconnection of the fields of political and economic elites would be likely to surprise more than one sociologist of modernisation. It is firstly rather common that members of the Swiss parliament at the same time serve on the boards of influential firms or of economic interest associations (Kriesi 1998). A second form of elite field coordination are interactional relations – for example, in networks of interlocking directorates, in the militia army or in service clubs (Jann 2003; Schilliger 2005). Finally, the small size of the country and its limited number of universities has prevented a strong differentiation of recruitment channels into different fields of elites (Rothböck 1999; Hartmann 2007). Law or technical degrees from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETHZ) are common entrance portals into both the fields of economic and political elites. This close connectedness of the fields of political and economic elite makes Switzerland a rather suitable case to tackle a major theoretical puzzle of the study of elite coordination: by analysing the relationship between the economic and the political elite, we will compare the concepts of 'interactional relations', such as those used in network theories, and 'objective relations', such as used in the Bourdieusian framework – two terms that are often seen as rival and mutually exclusive. We argue through our empirical analysis that these two forms of relationships can and should be fruitfully combined. At the same time we think that the combination of these two approaches will allow us to improve our understanding of the Swiss elite coordination, in a context thus characterised by a weak sectorial differentiation and a smallness that favours personal interactions among elite members (Katzenstein 1984). Our enquiry will be guided by the concern with identifying the relevant fractions of the fields of political and economic elites, the articulation of interactional and objective relations between them, and finally the consequences of this articulation for the relations of power within and between the two fields.

To address these concerns, we will first discuss the potential of a combination of 'objective relations' and 'interactional relations'. Then we will describe our research strategies and present the data. In section 4, we present the descriptive analyses of the political and economic elite fields in Switzerland. Following this, we will empirically examine three channels of exchange across elite fields. To conclude, we will revisit the research questions and reflect on the mechanisms of amplification and exclusion across the two fields of elites.

2. Coordination across the fields of political and economic elites

The modernisation of western societies can be understood as a process of social differentiation (Parsons 1971; Bourdieu 1989). In the course of this process, a series of autonomous spheres or fields have crystallised with their own specific structures, functions and rules. We might distinguish between economic, political, scientific, cultural and military fields. In Bourdieu's terms, a field is a relatively autonomous space endowed with a structure, rules, stakes and positions that engender strategic practices (Bourdieu 1989). The structure and rules of the field have historically developed and imposed themselves upon actors who are interested in 'playing the game'. As the fields are also always fields of struggles, the rules are part of the stakes and can potentially form a part of conflict or negotiation. Therefore, each field is composed of several fractions, most importantly of the dominant and the dominated (Bourdieu 1989).

In this paper, we are interested in the relations among these fractions and fields. An important aspect of Mills' critical reformulation of elite theory in the 1950s was the analysis of the links between the political and the economic elite (Mills 1956). Since then, the formal development and the increasing importance of network analysis has brought about a certain differentiation of the studies of political and economic elites. Even though there have always been and still are studies that examine both the political and economic elite fields simultaneously,¹ political elites and corporate elites have become separate research fields (Scott 1990). Influential scholars such as Scott (1990), Mizruchi (1996) and Carroll (2010) have specialised in the analysis of corporate elites by means of network analysis. Rare, however, are their points of contact with research on political elites in political science, which within a descriptive framework tries to establish historically and comparatively, whether the existence of elites is compatible with democracy (Best & Cotta, 2000; Engelstad and Gulbrandsen 2007).

In this contribution, we seek to reinforce an approach that considers the fields of political and economic elites simultaneously. We will examine the relations across fields and the repercussions of these bridges for the power structure within each of the fields. When it comes to the relations between the fields, we might distinguish three forms: (a) personal interchange, (b) interactional relations, and (c) structural homology. In particular, the latter two forms of relationship are illustrative of two influential research perspectives in recent elite research which have often been considered as

1. Especially in the countries where there is a certain exchange between the two elite groups – such as France (Charle 1987), the US (Freitag 1975; Domhoff 2005), and Switzerland (Kriesi 1980; Rothböck *et al.* 1999).

opponents: ‘interactional relations’ in the sense of network theory and ‘objective relations’ in Bourdieu’s sense. In what follows, we present each of these forms of relationship and then explain why we think these two forms should be fruitfully combined.

2.1. Personal interchange

The highest degree of elite integration is reached when the same persons exert functions within several fields of the society (Mills 1956). This would be a sign of a weak autonomy of these fields. It means that the fields have failed to establish a set of own rules and are unable to create institutionalised organisations or form groups of specialists that are pursuing an independent educational curriculum. In modern and differentiated societies, the case where one and the same person simultaneously occupies several leading positions seems to be rather rare. But, as the Swiss case shows, a weak professionalisation of the fields of political and economic elites can lead to a situation in which the same person fulfils roles as a member of parliament and as a corporate CEO. The accumulation of power that potentially goes along with such ubiquity is considerable and increases the risk of particularistic strategies. However, the more probable case – one which, for instance, occurs in the United States or France – is that the same person occupies positions in several fields successively, in the course of his or her biographical trajectory (Freitag 1975; Charle 1987).

2.2. Interactional relations

A large part of the elite literature relies on interactional relations as the most important elite coordination mechanism (Scott 1990; Mizruchi 1996). In this case, the members of the elites meet regularly in specific places in order to exchange information and develop common strategies (instrumental function), as well as to build a common ideology and identity (expressive function) (Caroll 2010). In research on corporate elites, interlocking directorates are doubtlessly the most widely analysed place of these two forms of elite coordination. In our analysis of two Swiss elite fields, we will examine interactional relations in different forms: on the one hand, we investigate interlocking directorates and use the degree of centrality as an indicator of power within the field of economic elites. On the other hand, we examine specific meeting places that institutionalise the nexus between the fields of political and business elites in Switzerland. Particularly useful for this purpose is the study of service clubs or the military. These operate as meeting places that simultaneously

strengthen the unity of the elites (on the principle of co-optation),² are rigorously closed to outsiders, and maintain discretion in their rituals and rules (Useem 1980; Jann 2003; Schilliger 2005; Carroll 2010).³

2.3. Structural homology

A less visible, but equally effective mechanism of elite coordination is what Bourdieu calls ‘objective relations’ or ‘structural homologies’. In contrast to social relationships where people personally interact with each other, here the people are related by the same objective social position and a similar structural relation to educational or economic capital. Two positions are thus deemed to be structurally homologous when they share a common relative position towards other positions, therefore developing kindred patterns of perception, reflexion and action. Bourdieu speaks, for example, of the homology between two dominant or dominated groups within the same field (1979) or the positions of groups in different fields (1988).⁴ As fundamental political or economic positions and ideas are fostered during education, in this paper we specifically examine homology of educational capital of elite groups (Bourdieu 1989). In particular, one’s chosen discipline of study at university, for instance, law, business or social sciences, is both a practical result of pre-existing dispositions and a mighty mechanism of reinforcement and intellectual refinement of these dispositions (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990). These dispositional homologies facilitate elite coordination, even though they function partially without direct interaction.

2.4. Combine objective and interactional relationships theoretically

Contributions that compare ‘objective relations’ to ‘interactional relations’ often emphasise their mutual exclusiveness (Bottero and Crossley 2011). Bourdieu himself repeatedly presented the two perspectives as antagonistic

2. This election procedure gives the existing group members the right to determine who can and cannot become a member of the group.
3. Meeting places are not easy to operationalise empirically. In the Swiss case, the Rotary Club and the army are both examples of nationally influential organisations. The Rotary Club is the largest Swiss service club at the national level, while the Swiss army counts as a traditional elite training institution (Jann 2003). However, they were chosen here also for pragmatic reasons, as they are some of the few such institutions on which we have data.
4. To give a concrete example, the actors without a university degree in the field of political and economic elites share a homologous situation, as they are both confronted to fractions who possess a high volume of educational capital in their respective fields.

and interactional relations – such as used in network analysis – as epiphenomenal manifestations of more fundamental objective relations. In his writing on the principles of economic anthropology, he states that *'by contrast with the interactionist vision, which knows no other form of social efficacy than the 'influence' directly exerted by one enterprise (or person entrusted with representing it) over another through some form of 'interaction', the structural vision takes account of effects that occur outside of any interaction: the structure of the field, defined by the unequal distribution of capital [...]'* (Bourdieu 2005: 76). Advocates of network analysis, however, contend that *'his [Bourdieu's] account operates at a level of abstraction that often makes it hard to discern the mechanisms by which 'objective relations' to capital generate the effects that he attributes to them'* (Bottero and Crossley 2011). Only through personal contact, they hold, actors are able to coordinate themselves and to acquire similar mental dispositions. In our eyes, this opposition is in no way justified. We think that both types of relations can play an important role in elite coordination and that their articulation should be studied empirically.

2.5. Research questions

This combination of two usually opposed research perspectives can then be translated into a set of three research questions. We begin with a simple description of the structure of the fields and then move to the explanation of patterns or articulation between the two forms of interactions: (a) The aim of the first point of enquiry is to understand the structures of the two fields, to identify the fractions that compose it and to investigate the relations between them *within* the respective field: what is the respective structure of the field? Which fractions can we identify and in what relation do these fractions stand to each other? (b) In a second step, we then seek to identify the fractions in a given field that cultivate linkages to the other field – in terms of personal interchange, interactional relations and structural homology. We therefore ask which fractions in both fields are endowed with links to the respective other field. (c) This allows us finally to ask how interactional and structural relations are articulated. Do interactional and structural relationships concur, maybe reinforce each other? Or are they different or even competing ways of elite coordination?

3. Research strategy and data

With this set of research questions in mind, the challenge is then to find an appropriate strategy to study them empirically. Traditionally,

Bourdiesian scholars have preferred Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) to examine objective relations, whereas representatives of interaction theories relied on network analysis. Recently, certain scholars have argued that when it comes to methods, these two approaches are not as remote from each other as is often insinuated (De Nooy 2003; Lemercier and Zalc 2008). Agreeing in principle with this point of view, we propose in this paper a methodological blend that is based on the integration of interactional indicators into a specific MCA (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010).

MCA is a multivariate method that condenses the information contained in a large number of variables and represents this information in a relational graph (De Saint Martin and Bourdieu 1978; Bourdieu 1984). It constructs a *cloud of categories* and a *cloud of individuals* illustrating the system of relationships between variables and individuals. The interpretation of the space is based on proximity between categories and individuals. The close proximity of two categories increases the probability that an individual possessing one of these characteristics is also endowed with the other. MCA allows the individuals as social actors to become visible again and is able to grasp the conflictive or cooperative relationships between different fractions of a field (De Saint Martin and Bourdieu 1978). In addition, we argue that MCA – though it is usually deemed to be closely linked to the illustration of ‘objective relations’ (in Bourdieu’s sense) – is capable of analysing both ‘objective’ and ‘interactional’ relations within and between fields. To open it to interactional relations, we (a) integrate network indicators as variables in the analysis and (b) use meeting place-indicators as variables that allow us to illustrate the interactional linkages between fields. To gain a solid picture of the power structures within both fields, we first consider the two fields separately. In a second step, we examine the individuals that cultivate relations into the other field.⁵

5. To understand the relations between two fields there are two strategies available: to analyse them within a single space (see for example Hjellebrette *et al.* 2007) or to compare two different field analyses. We have no *a priori* preference, but think that in our case a two space-solution might be more interesting and appropriate: (a) according to Bourdieu fields are endowed with specific logics, structures, resources and stakes. If one is interested in these differences, then a separate analysis can be more appropriate. (b) As opposed to Hjellebrette *et al.* (2007) or also Denord *et al.* (2011) we do not have at our disposal data on all sectors of society (such as university, church, legal system, art, etc.). However, we probably have more detailed information on both the fields of political and the economic elite. Therefore, we decided to concentrate on the relations between these two fields specifically and not to conceptualise the two as part of one single field of power.

3.1. Data

The data were collected as part of the project ‘Les elites Suisses au XXe siècle: un processus de différenciation inachevé?’⁶ Two databases have been used in our analysis: the first contains data about the CEOs and presidents of the board of the 110 largest Swiss companies in the year 2000 ($n = 191$). The second consists of similar data about the members of parliament and the seven federal councillors in 2000, who here are considered as representatives of the Swiss political elite ($n = 256$).⁷

The construction of the field of political elites is based on three segments of variables that correspond to the three theoretically formulated forms of bridging between the fields. The segment concerning *educational capital* is based on types of education (law, business studies, social sciences and humanities, engineering, agriculture and other disciplines⁸ or other education) and location of the university (French-speaking universities, University of Zurich, Universities of Basel and St. Gallen, ETHZ and University of Bern⁹).¹⁰ Second, we take into account the *participation in interactional relations* by using two variables: (a) membership in the Rotary Club (Rotary yes vs. Rotary no)¹¹ and (b) the military rank (no military rank, lieutenant, captain/major, or colonel). We do not consider military rank so much as a power resource but as participation in an important network whose members share ideas

6. This project has been conducted at the University of Lausanne by Thomas David and André Mach, with funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation. The data collection has been carried out by Stéphanie Ginalski, Frédéric Rebmann, Andrea Pilotti and Steven Piguët.

7. Both of these definitions of the economic and political elites are selective and raise certain problems. In the field of political elites, it seems obvious that additional groups such as the civil servants, party officials, and members of regional political elites (i.e., the members of cantonal governments) are also important. For data collection purposes, we had to constrain ourselves to members of parliament and members of the federal government.

8. The label ‘agriculture and other disciplines’ refers also to other non-university occupations such as teachers, nurses or tradesmen. Only a part of this group has an education in agriculture.

9. Because in MCA every category must be larger than 5%, we have pragmatically pooled together the French-speaking universities. Also, as only few politicians have a degree from St. Gall, it has been grouped together with the University of Basel.

10. To avoid an imbalanced analysis we have discarded the educational level as an active variable.

11. Because of their secretive nature and the decentralised structures, data about service clubs, such as the Rotary Club, are rare and require a cumbersome data collection process. We were able, for the first time, for the whole of Switzerland, to access these data at the Swiss National Library.

and information discharged of daily pressures and tasks, and are socialised in a similar ideological environment (Jann 2003). To capture *personal interchange* with the economic field, we examine whether the politicians occupy at the same time executive or board positions in large private companies (Board yes vs. Board no). We also consider whether they are members of the committees of one of the large business interest associations (Eco_interest yes vs. Eco_interest No).¹² Finally, we integrate indicators for the *current position* in the field of political elites. It is defined by a combination of membership in party committee (yes vs. no), party membership (SVP, CVP, Liberal Party, the left (social-democratic and green party), or other party¹³), and institutional anchorage (National Council and Senate). Members of historically pivotal middle-right parties (CVP, the Liberal Party and the SVP, to a certain extent), which still today are often able to tip the scales in an increasingly polarised political arena, as well as the members of the more influential Senate tend to occupy the most powerful positions. In other words, the party membership can be an indicator for certain power resources (corresponding to the influence of this party) in the specific Swiss balance of power. The socio-demographic indicators include gender (men vs. women) and are merely used as illustrative variables.¹⁴

The construction of the field of economic elites followed a similar logic, even though certain political variables do not apply here and further economic variables have to be integrated. The segment concerning *educational capital* comprises educational level (non-academic, BA/MA, Ph.D.), type of education (law, business studies, engineering, other

12. Economic Interest Associations, according to Schmitter and Streeck (1999), figure as intermediary organisations and, in this function, both articulate the interests of their members (i.e., the logic of the membership) and influence the political process (i.e., the logic of influence). For an application to the Swiss case, see ‘Publication of the authors (2009)’.

13. In the year 2000, based on the election of 1999, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP, which is culturally conservative-nationalist and economically liberal) occupied 30% of the seats; the Christian-Democratic Party (CVP, which is culturally conservative and economically moderately liberal) occupied 15%; the Liberal-Democratic Party (FDP, which is culturally and economically liberal) occupied 18%; the Social-Democratic Party (SPS, which is culturally liberal and economically moderately welfare-oriented) comprised 25% of members of parliament; and the Green Party (GP, which is culturally liberal and economically moderately welfare-oriented, and emphasises environmental issues) comprised 10% of MPs. As smaller parties were counted under the category of their closest political ally, these numbers slightly differ from the ‘official’ proportions.

14. We have integrated age in a former version of these analyses, but it was not a significant factor.

education),¹⁵ place of education (ETHZ, University of Zurich, Universities of Basel and Bern, Universities Romandes, University of St. Gallen or a university abroad), and type of further training (MBA vs. other). Participation in *interactional relations* is measured with the same variables we have used for the field of political elites: membership in the Rotary Club (Rotary yes vs. Rotary no) and the rank in military (no military rank, lieutenant, captain/major, colonel). Third, we measure *personal interchange* by examining whether the members of the business elite occupy positions in the political field. For this purpose, we scan whether the members of the economic elite partake in extra-parliamentary commissions¹⁶ (Yes ex parl comm vs. No ex parl comm). Furthermore, we constructed a variable of participation in political associations. It is a binary variable that unites business leaders who, as members of a party, are sitting in the federal parliament and/or those who are members of a committee of an economic interest association¹⁷ (Pol Assoc yes vs. Pol Assoc no). In addition, we introduce indicators for the *current position*, which will allow us to distinguish between dominant and dominated fractions. The distinction is captured by the function on the board (CEO vs. President), the sector of principal mandate (services, banking, insurance, chemistry, machine industry, construction, distribution, or others), the firm centrality, and the personal betweenness in the corporate network.¹⁸ The most powerful positions are occupied by those in the most

15. Engineering is only used as a passive category. It appeared to be redundant with the category ETHZ (as this University is the only one that dispenses training in engineering in Switzerland at this level).

16. The *dictionnaire historique de la Suisse* defines extra-parliamentary commissions as 'organisms affiliated to the federal administration, which, in its majority, is composed of persons external to the civil service. They are deployed in almost all sectors of activity of the administration'. See <http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D10393.php> (accessed 1 June 2011; translated by the authors).

17. Among these powerful actors of Swiss political life, we can count economic interest associations such as 'Economie Suisse', interest associations of specific sectors such as 'Schweizerische Bankiervereinigung', and also unions such as 'Union syndicale suisse/Schweizerischer Gewerkschaftsbund'.

18. This integration of network indicators as an MCA modality is rather recent and goes beyond the orthodoxy of analysis of the economic field. For a more detailed methodological explanation, see Albrecht (2002; publication of authors, 2012). The degree of *firm centrality* is an expression of the number of ties a company has to other companies in the network, whereas the *betweenness of persons* determines the extent to which a person lies between other nodes in the network. We are aware that these indicators of network centrality cover only one aspect of power (and neglect others) and that the interpretation of network centrality depends on the content of the network relations. Nevertheless we consider network centrality as a comparatively good indicator of power (Borgatti *et al.* 2002).

central companies of the two most important sectors of Swiss economy in 2000 – banking and machine industry. Because women are – even as late as 2000 – almost completely absent from the sample of business leaders, gender is not a variable in the analyses.

4. The relational structure *within* the political and economic elite fields

As the first step of the analysis, we construct the relational space of categories and individuals within each of the elite fields. We limit ourselves to the first two axes and display the categories that contribute to the construction of the field.

4.1. The field of the political elite

Four questions contribute strongly to the variance of the first axis: party membership (27.3%), military rank (15.9%), Rotary Club (14.1%) and board membership (13.6%). These four questions explain about 71% of the variance of the first axis. The 10 categories retained for the interpretation of the first axis (bold in Figure 1a) amount to 76% of the variance. In the west of the first axis can be found: Board yes (12.4%), Yes Rotary (11.8%), Liberals (9.8%), ETHZ (4.5%), Senate (4%), Captain (3.7%) and Colonel (3.5%). In the east we find the Left (14.5%), Social Sciences/Humanities (7.0%) and No military rank (5.0%). The second axis is dominated by the four following questions amounting to 84% of the variance: Educational discipline (36.3%), Party (22.5%), University (14.5%), and Military Rank (11.0%). Eight categories, representing 79% of the variance, have been retained for the interpretation of the second axis (*italics* in Figure 1a). In the upper half, the following are situated: Agriculture and other disciplines (21.1%), SVP (17.7%), and ETHZ (9.2%). The following may be found in the lower half: Law (11.6%), Lieutenant-Colonel (5.6%), Senate (5.2%), Extra-parliamentary Commission (4.2%) and University of Bern (4.1%).

TABLE 1. Eigenvalues and variance of the axes in the political field

Axes	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Eigenvalue	0.199	0.164	0.153	0.147	0.135	0.131	0.124	0.120	0.109	0.103
Variance%	8.74	7.20	6.73	6.43	5.92	5.76	5.43	5.25	4.78	4.52
Modified rate	44.34	18.52	12.85	9.77	5.46	4.39	2.52	0.17	0.00	0.00




Figure 1. Space of the Swiss political elite: (a) Cloud of categories and (b) cloud of individuals

Legend: (▼) Political Party; (▷) Party Committee; (►) Type of Education; (▽) Economic Interest Association; (△) Board of Directors; (■) Chamber of Parliament; (+) Military Rank; (◆) Rotary Club; (○) University; (◇) Extra-parliamentary Commission.

This means that the first axis distinguishes between parliamentary members with close links to the field of economic elites in the west (they are members of boards, they participate in the rotary club, rank high in the army, and are members of the liberal party¹⁹) and the political Left with no such links in the east. The second axis distinguishes between those without university education in the upper half (mainly also members of the partly agrarian SVP) from those with a university education, for example, in law. Therefore we might distinguish three fractions: in the lower-west quadrant are the members of parliament of the parties of the centre-Right and the members of the senate. In addition, these actors possess a rather high educational capital (often a PhD in law) and accumulate most of the possible channels of interaction with the field of economic elites: Rotary Club, military ranks, members of boards and members of extra-parliamentary commissions. This group can be considered as the dominant fraction. In the upper half, we find the agrarian fraction, which includes members of the SVP who rank also in the military, but who possess only little educational capital and therefore are also excluded from expertise-based bridges to the economic field (such as boards or extra-parliamentary commissions). The most dominated fraction is, however, the Left in the lower-east quadrant of the plane – they are politically in the minority, underrepresented in the senate, possess only degrees in social sciences and humanities; they are also excluded from meeting places (such as Rotary Club or the military) and do not personally interchange with the economic field (boards, extra-parliamentary commissions or interest associations²⁰).

4.2. The field of the economic elite

The first axis is dominated by six questions, explaining 77% of its variance: Political Association (17.7%), Military Rank (14.7%), Betweenness (11.7%), Educational Level (11.6%), Extra-Parliamentary Commission (10.9%) and Sector (9.9%). The 13 categories retained for the interpretation of this axis (bold in the Figure 2a) add up to 81% of the variance. On the west side of the plane are situated: Pol Assoc yes (15.6%), Yes ex parl comm (10.2%), PhD (6.4%), Law (5.9%), Betweenness 21–50 (5.2%), Colonel (6.1%), Centrality 11–50 (4.3%), BQSF (4.2%) and UniSG/UniBa (3.5%). On the east are located the three following categories: No Military (5.3%), No Uni (4.8%) and Centrality 50+ (3.3%). Four questions, University (20.4%), Sector (16.4%), Educational

19. The liberal party is historically – and still today – very close to business.

20. Except some trade unionists.

TABLE 2. Eigenvalues and variance of the axes in the economic field

<i>Axes</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>12</i>
Eigenvalue	0.199	0.184	0.151	0.137	0.124	0.119	0.117	0.104	0.099	0.094	0.090	0.087
Variance%	8.23	7.59	6.25	5.66	5.12	4.91	4.84	4.32	4.10	3.86	3.73	3.60
Modified rate	37.34	28.12	12.85	8.04	4.57	3.49	3.19	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00





Figure 2. Space of the Swiss business elite: (a) Cloud of categories and (b) cloud of individuals

Legend: (+) Military Rank; (O) University; (◆) Rotary Club; (◀) Centrality; (▶) Type of Education; (x) Educational Level; (▲) Board of Directors; (□) Betweenness; (●) Sector; (▷) Political Association; (◁) MBA; (*) Nationality.

level (14.5%) and Military Rank (14.2%), contribute particularly strongly to the second axis and amount to about 66% of its variance. The 14 categories in italics have been retained for the interpretation of this second axis. Together they explain 80% of the variance. They can be found in the upper half of the second axis: ETHZ (16.5%), MEM (9.5%), BA/MA (8.1%), Lieutenant-Colonel (8.0%), Centrality 11–50 (5.1%), Rotary Yes (4.7%), Yes MBA (4.3%) and Colonel (2.8%). In the lower half of the second axis, the following are located: Pol Assoc yes (4.5%), Yes ex parl comm. (4.2%), No Uni (3.8%), SER (3.2%), Centrality 50+ (3.0%) and PhD (2.6%).

In the field of economic elites, the first axis distinguishes between those who are central in the Swiss network and simultaneously close to the political field in the west, from those who are peripheral, possess little educational capital and are remote from the (Swiss) field of political elites in the East. The second axis further differentiates the western side of the plane into a financial and a technological pole: in the upper half, we can find those with a technical education working in the machine industry, whereas those who studied law and are on the apex of the large banks are situated in the lower half. We might speak of three fractions: the heterogeneous dominated fraction is situated on the eastern side, where many foreign managers can also be found. It accumulates the absence of educational capital (no university), a peripheral position in the Swiss network (centrality 50+), non-participation in meeting places (no military, but also no Rotary) and a remoteness from any link to the political field (no political association and no extra-parliamentary commission). The dominant fraction on the western half is two-headed: the technological fraction in the western-upper quadrant consists of engineers with degrees from the ETHZ. This fraction is central in the Swiss network, often has an MBA and also uses the meeting places offered by the army or the rotary club. However, it has only few personal links to the political field through political associations or extra-parliamentary commissions. The financial fraction in the western-lower quadrant is also in a dominant position: they possess very high educational capital (PhD in law), are also relatively central in the Swiss network, and its members rank in the army and are personally linked to the field political elites (through political associations and commissions).

4.3. Power leverages between the fields

The use of indicator ellipses that include about 40% of the individuals belonging to a category allows us to deepen the analysis of the forms of

relations between the fields and their articulation.²¹ We inspect specifically the location of the individuals who (1) interchange personally between the fields, (2) cultivate interactional relations between the fields, or (3) occupy homologue positions with respect to their educational capital. Figures 3 to 8 must be read in relation to one another, but also in relation to the cloud of categories as displayed in the Figures 1a and 2a. Figures 3, 5 and 7 refer to the political field (Figure 1a) and Figures 4, 6 and 8 refer to the economic field (Figure 2a).²² If actors in one field can be found in the same area, their endowment with capitals can be considered as cumulative. If in both fields the dominant fraction accumulates relation to the other field, then dominance in a field can be considered to be linked to these connections to the other field.

An examination of the field of political elites (Figures 3, 5 and 7) reveals that the channels of relations are, to a large degree, cumulative. The members of the middle-Right parties (Liberal Party, CVP and the non-agrarian fraction of the SVP) which are situated in the mid-western part of the political field combine also all forms of relations to the economic field. They possess degrees in law or from the ETHZ; they are, in addition, members of the Rotary Club and rank high in the army, and they have the highest likelihood to sit on a board of a large firm or on the committee of an economic interest association. The Left (in the eastern-lower part) and to a certain extent also the agrarian fraction of the SVP in the north are in contrast cumulatively excluded from all those bridges to the economic field. They are hardly ever educated in engineering, law or business; they participate neither in the Rotary Club or the army, and they sit rarely on boards or in committees of economic interest association.

The situation in the field of economic elites (Figures 4, 6 and 8) is similar, but must, however, be nuanced. Those holding engineering degrees from the ETHZ also participate often in the Rotary Club or the army and are therefore mainly linked through interactional relations to the field of political elites. By contrast, the fraction educated in law seems to prefer personal interchange in the form of political associations or extra-parliamentary commissions to make links to the political elite field. The

21. Usually concentration ellipses (with 86% of individuals) are used. As we make no hypothesis on the form of the ellipses, we think that in this case indicator ellipses improve the visibility and therefore the interpretability of the fraction across fields. It is smaller and allows therefore a better visual identification of fractions.
22. It is important to note, that the two spaces are differently constructed and that therefore the mean distances between positions and the mean modality points differ. Nevertheless, the overall constellation of the field is comparable and the graphs give an impression of the main structural homologies, as well as the interactions between the two fields.




Figure 3. Structural homology in the political field
Legend: (▼) law; (+) business; (●) ETHZ.




Figure 4. Structural homology in the economic field
Legend: (▼) law; (+) business; (●) ETHZ.




Figure 5. Interactional relations in the political field
Legend: (▼) Rotary; (●) Military.




Figure 6. Interactional relations in the economic field
Legend: (▼) Rotary; (●) Military.




Figure 7. Personal interchange in the political field
Legend: (▼) Board yes; (●) Military; (▼) Yes exp parl comm.; (●) Pol Assoc yes.




Figure 8. Personal interchange in the economic field
Legend: (▼) Board yes; (●) Military; (▼) Yes exp parl comm.; (●) Pol Assoc yes.

business fraction in the eastern part of the plane is excluded from both forms of interaction with the field of political elites.

5. Conclusions: Power amplifications and cumulative exclusions

Revisiting the traditional debate on the coordination of elites, we considered the coalitions within and between the fields of economic and political elites in Switzerland. In order to bring to fruition a combination of two approaches often considered to be incompatible – ‘objective relations’ and ‘interactional relations’ – we examined personal interchange, interactional relations and structural homology. For this purpose, we relied on a dataset of the CEOs and presidents of the boards of the 110 largest Swiss companies and 256 members of the Swiss political elite in 2000. The data were analysed with a specific MCA that integrates interactional indicators, such as meeting places and measures of network centrality. Turning back to our three research questions, we can now give the following answers:

- (a) How are the fields structured? Through a description of the two fields, we singled out specific fractions that are separated by particular cleavages: the field of *political elites* is differentiated in a dominant fractions consisting of members of the pivotal centre-Right parties, with high educational capital and close personal and institutional links to the economic field. It is opposed to an also well-linked but less educated agrarian SVP fraction, and to the left, with hardly any personal or institutional links to the economic field. In the field of *economic elites*, a dominated fraction cumulatively lacks educational capital, centrality in the Swiss network and any personal links or links through meeting places with politics. It is opposed to the financial and the technological fractions that dominate the Swiss economic elite: the members of the technological fraction hold engineering degrees from the ETHZ, and are central in the Swiss corporate network and well connected through military. The financial fraction often holds PhDs in law and cultivates personal connections into the political field through political associations or commissions.
- (b) Which fractions have links to the other field? The channels of exchange from the field of political to the field of economic elites are *cumulative*: a clearly confined fraction in the mid-western part of the political plane accumulates educational capital, interactional relations, and personal interchange. Of the political elite, almost only members of the CVP, the Liberal Party and the non-agrarian SVP fraction who hold degrees in law or engineering cultivate

contacts within the field of economic elites. Inversely, the members of the economic elite field who make connections with the field of political elites are either situated in the lower-western corner or in the upper half of the field. However, it seems as if the dominant fractions pursue different strategies to exchange with the field of the political elites: whereas the industrial fraction relies on the Rotary Club, the financial fraction participates in political associations or extra-parliamentary commissions. Both fractions use the army as a meeting place.

- (c) How are the interactional and objective relation articulated? It seems conspicuous that in both fields, the fractions that are able to build interactional bridges onto the other field come from *similar educational backgrounds*. They are trained in law or in engineering at the ETH Zürich. We can assert that the dominant groups within the Swiss elites share structural homologue positions and constantly reinforce and confirm these homologies by direct interactions. Two aspects seem interesting: first, the coincidence between educational homology and interaction is stronger in the field of political elites. In the economic elite field, the two heads of the dominant fraction share both different educational trajectories and different forms of interaction with the political elite field – whereas the law-oriented financial fraction uses personal interchange, the technical fraction relies stronger on meeting places. Second, the dominated groups cumulatively lack a homologue relation to educational capital and – perhaps as a consequence of this – are unable to establish stable channels of interactional contacts across field boundaries.

It seems as if in Switzerland the accumulation of different forms of bridges through personal interchange or meeting places by elites enlarges the span of the power their dominant fractions beyond the limits of their own field. We can hypothesise that this outreach amplifies their power in their own field; or, inversely, that the dominant position that they enjoy in their own field makes them eligible for positions of power in the other field. This might be typical for a small country where people at the top quickly get to know each other and are able, due also to geographical proximity, to constantly renew and reinforce their similitudes through personal contacts (Katzenstein 1984). It could also be also a consequence of the weak functional differentiation of the political and the economic field. In a context where political or military functions are hardly professionalised, different forms of relations between the fields become complementary and reinforce each other (Kriesi 1998). When we compare this Swiss coincidence between structural and interactional relations, to other, larger countries it seems that Switzerland represents a particularly strong case of

elite coordination. Germany and Italy for example seem to lack common educational institutions for elites and therefore also lack strong structural homologies between elite fields. In the UK, however, where such common educational institutions are present (Oxbridge), we observe only little mobility or interchange between the elite fields. Only countries such as France or Spain combine strong structural relations with systematic personal interchange. However, even in these countries the interactional relations are mainly based on a successive biographical circulation between fields rather than on systematic simultaneous personal interchange (Hartmann 2007). So even compared to these countries Switzerland seems to be a case of particularly strong and complementary elite coordination.

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Appendix

<i>Contributions of active variables</i>			<i>Political field</i>			<i>Economic field</i>			
<i>Segment</i>	<i>Variables</i>	<i>Modalities</i>	<i>Axis 1</i>	<i>Axis 2</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Axis 1</i>	<i>Axis 2</i>	<i>n</i>	
Educational Capital	Educational Level	Non-Academic	–	–	90	4.8	3.8	28	
		BA/MA	–	–	105	0.4	8.1	86	
		PhD	–	–	61	6.4	2.6	54	
		TOTAL	–	–	256	11.6	14.5	168	
	Type of Education	Law	1.2	11.6	79	5.9	1.1	37	
		Medicine & Natural Sc.	0.0	0.5	25	–	–		
		Humanities & Social Sc.	7.0	3.0	26	–	–		
		Business Studies	0.6	0.1	26	0.6	1.9	49	
		Agriculture and other	0.3	21.1	17	–	–		
		Other Education	–	–	35	0.1	0.1	21	
		TOTAL	9.1	36.3	208	6.6	3.1	107	
		University	Uni Zurich	0.0	0.1	24	1.5	0.8	12
			Uni Romandes	0.7	9.2	31	0.1	0.4	16
			ETHZ	4.5	1.0	17	0.1	16.5	29
	Uni Basel & St.Gallen		2.5	0.0	18	3.5	0.4	21	
	Uni Berne		1.9	4.1	19	0.4	2.4	10	
	TOTAL	9.6	14.5	109	5.6	20.4	88		
	MBA	MBA Yes	–	–		0.5	4.3	32	
		MBA No	–	–		0.1	0.9	152	
		TOTAL	–	–		0.6	5.9	184	
	Rotary	No Rotary	2.3	0.0	214	0.5	1.4	162	
Yes Rotary		11.8	0.0	42	1.7	4.7	22		
TOTAL		14.1	0.0	256	2.1	6.0	184		
Meeting place	Military Rank	No Military Grade	5.0	0.0	174	5.3	2.4	112	
		Lieutenant	1.1	5.6	14	0.0	8.0	12	
		Captain	3.7	1.5	25	3.3	1.0	18	
		Major	2.5	1.2	14				
		Colonel	3.5	2.6	29	6.1	2.8	42	
		TOTAL	15.9	11.0	256	14.7	14.2	184	
Personal Interchange	Board Membership	Board No	1.2	0.1	234	–	–		
		Board yes	12.4	0.9	22	–	–		
		TOTAL	13.6	1.0	256	–	–		
	Economic Interest Association	Eco Interest No	0.1	0.1	234	–	–		
		Eco Interest Yes	1.2	0.8	22	–	–		
		TOTAL	1.3	0.9	256	–	–		

APPENDIX (Continued)

<i>Contributions of active variables</i>			<i>Political field</i>			<i>Economic field</i>		
<i>Segment</i>	<i>Variables</i>	<i>Modalities</i>	<i>Axis 1</i>	<i>Axis 2</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Axis 1</i>	<i>Axis 2</i>	<i>n</i>
Political Position	Extra-parliamentary commission	Comm ex. parl	0.3	0.7	218	0.7	0.3	173
		No						
		Comm. ex. parl	1.8	4.2	38	10.2	4.2	11
	Political Association	Yes						
		TOTAL	2.1	4.9	256	10.9	4.5	184
		Political Association	–	–		15.6	4.5	22
	Party	Yes						
		Political Association No	–	–		2.1	0.6	162
		TOTAL	–	–		17.7	5.1	184
		Other Parties	1.5	0.6	15	–	–	
		CVP	1.4	1.4	57	–	–	
		Liberal Party	9.8	0.6	63	–	–	
		Left	14.5	2.2	69	–	–	
		SVP	0.1	17.7	52	–	–	
TOTAL		27.3	22.5	256	–	–		
Chamber		National Council	0.9	1.5	203	–	–	
		Senate	4.0	5.2	46	–	–	
	TOTAL	4.9	6.7	256	–	–		
Party Committee	Party Committee no	0.2	0.3	227	–	–		
	Party Committee yes	1.8	2.0	29	–	–		
	TOTAL	2.0	2.3	256	–	–		
	Board Function	CEO	–	–		0.2	0.6	106
Economic Position	Sector	President of Board	–	–		0.3	0.8	78
		TOTAL	–	–		0.5	1.4	184
		SER	–	–		1.6	3.2	28
	BQSF	–	–		4.2	0.9	27	
	ASSR	–	–		1.8	0.1	11	
	CHIM	–	–		0.1	0.9	14	
	MEM	–	–		0.3	9.5	55	
	CONST + ENG	–	–		0.0	0.4	18	
	DIST	–	–		1.9	0.7	18	
	Other Sector	–	–		0.0	0.8	13	
	TOTAL	–	–		9.9	16.4	184	
	Centrality	Centrality 1–10	–	–		0.4	0.0	17
		Centrality 11–50	–	–		4.3	5.1	61
		Centrality 50 +	–	–		3.3	3.0	106
TOTAL		–	–		8.0	8.2	184	

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EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

APPENDIX (*Continued*)

<i>Contributions of active variables</i>			<i>Political field</i>			<i>Economic field</i>		
<i>Segment</i>	<i>Variables</i>	<i>Modalities</i>	<i>Axis 1</i>	<i>Axis 2</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Axis 1</i>	<i>Axis 2</i>	<i>n</i>
	Betweenness	Betweenness	–	–		3.0	0.3	20
		1–20						
		Betweenness	–	–		5.2	0.4	30
		21–50						
		Betweenness	–	–		2.2	0.2	40
		51–90						
		Betweenness	–	–		1.2	0.1	94
		90 +						
		TOTAL	–	–		11.7	1.0	184

Bold: categories > average contribution (for political space: $100/10 = 10.00$; for economic space: $100/12 = 8.33$). *Italics:* modalities > average contribution (for political space: $100/32 = 3.13$; for economic space: $100/40 = 2.50$).