Islamophobia in Switzerland:
A New Phenomenon or a New Name for Xenophobia?

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Introduction

In the context of the growing number of immigrants from Muslim countries and terrorist attacks committed by Islamic fundamentalists over the last few years it is a common argument that hostilities towards immigrants from Muslim countries have increased in the last years. A new concept has been appeared, islamophobia, that has attracted the attention of social scientists. The aim of my chapter is to analyse islamophobia more systematically and to investigate whether attitudes towards Muslim have changed over the last few years. To better apprehend islamophobia I will relate it to the concept of xenophobia and discuss whether we can consider islamophobia as a new social phenomenon or a new name for xenophobia.

In a first step, I will show how xenophobic and islamophobic Swiss are, whether or not these attitudes have changed over time and compare these findings with other studies and countries. Contrary to other studies, we are in the position to investigate the development of xenophobia and islamophobia as well as their interrelationship over time by accounting for the two waves of the World Value Survey in Switzerland in 1996 and 2007.[1] In a second step and in more detail, I will discuss the interrelationship between xenophobia and islamophobia. While a few studies have sought to explain islamophobia, I know of only two works that have investigated the relationship between these two phenomena (Stolz 2006; Kühnel and Leibhold 2007). My intention is to continue this investigation and to add new analytical elements in order to better understand how these two concepts relate to each other.

The crucial question that has already been asked by Kühnel and Leibhold (2007: 136) is whether islamophobia is different from xenophobia or whether the first is only a concretisation of the second and means nothing else than hostile attitudes towards a specific group of foreigners, i.e. immigrants from Muslim countries. By means of factor analyses Stolz (2006: 559-560) as well as Kühnel and Leibhold (2007) show that islamophobia cannot be differentiated from xenophobia. This suggests that xenophobic people are nowadays mainly islamophobic, as Muslims constitute a very important immigration group. Analogically, you could have called xenophobic Swiss in the 1950 and 1960 italophobic, as in these two decades immigrants from Italy attracted most hostilities towards foreigners.

As we will see, my factor analysis confirms the findings by Stolz (2006) and Kühnel and Leibhold (2007), however less clearly as one might expect. But even if the same people show hostile attitudes towards both immigrants and Muslims, this does not imply that islamophobia is the same as xenophobia. For the same people might be xenophobic and islamopho-

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[1] The question to operationalize islamophobia has not been asked in the first wave of the World Value Survey (WVS) in Switzerand in 1989. The study by Kühnel and Leibhold (2007) only compares the very short period between 2003 and 2005.

bic for different reasons. To tackle this problem we have to formulate and test concrete arguments why these two concepts might constitute different social phenomena. Contrary to Stolz (2006) and Kühnel and Leibhold (2007) I will thus provide some theoretical considerations why people might have different attitudes towards toward immigrants in general and Muslims in particular.

While xenophobia is defined as a general hostility towards foreigners, it might be argued that islamophobia stands for hostility towards specific aspects of foreignness. It might be that immigrants from Muslim countries are not disliked because they are not Swiss and culturally different but because they defend ideas that completely contradict the basic values of Western liberal states (see Schiffauer 2007). 'Islam' and 'Muslims' are primarily notions for a religion and persons with a certain religious affiliation respectively. Halliday (1999: 898) however argues that it is not the religion itself that is perceived by islamophobic people as a threatening force—contrary to the past when 'Islam' was considered as an enemy during the periods of the crusades and the reconquista. Since Islam is not threatening to win large segments of Western Europe, islamophobia does not constitute hostilities against Islam as a faith but rather against Muslims as a cultural group of people.[2]

To clarify whether immigrants from Muslim countries are seen as an ethnic or a religious group and whether hostilities towards them result from the conviction that people with such a religious background constitute a danger for established religious groups in Switzerland we will test whether especially religious persons are afraid of Muslims. On the other hand, it could also be argued that religious people rather support Muslims as they seem to be confronted to similar problems, namely a secular society that leaves no space to religious matters.

The second way to reveal differences between xenophobia and islamophobia will consists in investigating the values of postmaterialists. It is often argued that Muslims do not respect the principles of gender equality and oppress women. More generally, many Westerners perceive them as belonging to a culture or religion where individual rights are subordinate to collective rights. It might therefore be that people for whom the position of women in society and individualism are crucial achievements of Western societies see them in danger with immigration from Muslim countries. It might thus very well be that such people—

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[2] For this reason the Federal Commission against Racism in Switzerland prefers to speak of 'racism against Muslims' instead of 'islamophobia'. It defines 'racism against Muslims' as racism against people who consider themselves as Muslims or are perceived as such. Although I completely agree with this definition I prefer to speak of islamophobia as it is more widely used in the literature.

postmodernists as I will call them—are islamophobic but have no hostile attitudes against foreigners in general.

Attitudes towards immigrants and Muslims might also differ depending on the specific national self-understanding of a person. It is widely recognized that attitudes towards others is highly influenced by how we see ourselves. Accordingly, nationalism/patriotism and xenophobia are the two sides of the same coin. Nonetheless, it might be that in-group favouritism does not necessarily imply hostility towards outsiders. After all, attitudes towards foreigners depend on which kind of national self-understanding prevails in a group or a person. On the basis of questions on attitudes towards naturalization criteria I will generate by means of a factor analysis three models of national self-understanding. One model includes questions concerning the Muslim headscarf and criteria that have recently appeared in the public debate and are often related toward immigrants from Muslim countries. It will be interesting to see whether or not this particular model of national self-understanding has the same impact on xenophobic and islamophobic attitudes.

Definition and operationalization of xenophobia and islamophobia

In this chapter I use the term xenophobia in a very general way to circumscribe hostilities towards foreigners that are based on prejudice and stereotypes. While you can be prejudiced against all sorts of groups whose members carry characteristics that are different from yours (age, gender, sexual preferences etc.), xenophobia constitutes stereotypical thinking or prejudiced attitudes towards groups or members of groups that can be distinguished on national or ethnic terms. To be more precise, I investigate attitudes towards immigrants, i.e. national or ethnic groups that are not Swiss.

While xenophobia is a widely used concept that knows various definitions and applications, islamophobia is a rather new concept that is much less familiar. According to Stolz (2005: 548) a good definition of islamophobia has to be attuned to already existing definitions from research in the field of racism and xenophobia in order to enable a comparison between islamophobia and other out-group phobias. Further, it has to be large enough to include all phenomena meant by the term (for example, not just attitudes towards Islam but also Muslim groups). Finally, it should be devoid of any theoretical explanations of the phenomenon, as these have to be tested empirically. On the basis of these criteria Stolz (2005: 548) gives the following definition of islamophobia that I will also use in this chapter: "Islamophobia is a rejection of Islam, Muslim groups and Muslim individuals on the basis of prejudice and

stereotypes. It may have emotional, cognitive, evaluative as well as action-oriented elements (e.g. discrimination, violence)".

At this point it has immediately to be specified that, of course, Muslims do not constitute a homogeneous cultural or ethnic group (as few as any other religious community). Muslims belong to various ethnic groups, are citizens of different countries and belong to different social classes. In Switzerland most Muslims come from regions and countries of the former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia) and Turkey (see CFR 2006: 7-8; Gianni 2005: 13-17). Finally, it has to be kept in mind that we commonly define people as Muslims that come from countries where Islam is the dominant religion. It is another question whether especially those people who now live in Western European countries are still (or have ever been) religious and/or practice their faith. It is estimated that around 10 to 15 per cent of all Muslims in Switzerland practice their religion (Gianni 2005: 10). Unfortunately, we have no data at hand to distinguish diverging attitudes towards different Muslim groups. Stolz (2005: 558-560) has however shown that Swiss do not make a big difference between Muslims in general and those from specific countries and regions. This has also been revealed in a project on local citizenship attribution in Switzerland: even local politicians consider candidates for naturalization from Muslim countries as a homogeneous group (Helbling 2008).

In 2006 about 340'000 people in Switzerland are Muslims of which around 12 per cent have a Swiss passport (either through birth or naturalization) (CFR 2006: 7-8; Gianni 2005: 14-17). The number of Muslims living in Switzerland increased heavily during the 1980 and 1990. While in 1980 only 56'625 Muslims were living in Switzerland this number increased to 152'217 in 1990 and 310'807 in 2000, which constitutes 4.3 per cent of the total population in Switzerland (Gianni 2005: 17). In Germany and Austria the ratio of Muslims also turns around 4 per cent whereas it amounts to around 10 per cent France and 6 per cent in the Netherlands. The ratio of the foreign population is much higher in Switzerland than in other Western European countries. Whereas in most European countries between 2 and 9 per cent of the population are non-citizen residents, Switzerland counts a foreign population of almost 20 per cent, only outreached by Luxemburg with 36 per cent. Part of this variation might be explained by the fact that Switzerland is a small and rich country in the middle of Europe that attracts a lot of foreign workers growing faster in percentages than in bigger countries. Another explanation of the high percentage of foreigners is the low naturalization rate that is largely due to the restrictive citizenship policy in this country (see Helbling 2008: ch.1).

In order to operationalize xenophobia and islamophobia the respondents where asked to mention whether or not they would like to have immigrants and/or Muslims as neighbours. This is a rather simple operationalization but the only one that is possible given the constraints of the questionnaire. Other studies have applied more elaborate indicators including information concerning attitudes towards the Muslim headscarf, general attitudes towards and trust in Muslims (Gonzales et al. 2007, Dekker and van der Noll 2007). However, most of these studies have used the 'neighbour-question' as part of their indexes. Since the same question has been asked to measure the attitudes towards various kinds of groups we will be in the position to better contextualize xenophobia and islamophobia. Moreover, relying on the World Value Survey allows us to compare Switzerland with a large range of other countries.

How xenophobic and islamophobic are Swiss?

Let us now look at how xenophobic and islamophobic Swiss are. Looking at Table 1 we immediately notice that in both years under investigation much more people do not like to have Muslims as neighbours than foreigners in general. While in 1996 roughly 10 per cent and in 2007 7 per cent were hostile against foreigners, the ratio of people who do not like to have Muslims in their neighbourhood increased 17.7 and 21.3 per cent. The results for Switzerland are partly confirmed by a survey that has been conducted in the town of Zurich in 1994/95 (Stolz 2005). Since different questions were asked a comparison of the two surveys has to be taken with a pinch of salt. Nonetheless, it is revealing that of all groups of foreigners for which the degree of sympathy was analyzed, people from the former Yugoslavia, Turkey and Arab countries—three groups largely made up of Muslims—are perceived as the least 'likeable' groups. Roughly 19, 27 and 33 per cent respectively think that foreigners from the former Yugoslavia, Turkey and Arab countries are little or not at all 'likeable' (Stolz 2005: 558-559). Such negative attitudes towards foreigners from South European countries and France do not exceed 5 per cent. Around 11 per cent find that Germans are little or not at all 'likeable'.

We further see that the degree of xenophobia slightly decreases at a significant level. To make sure that this result is not distorted by the specific 'neighbour-question' I listed in Table 1 two alternative operationalizations: I show how many people indicated that Switzerland should heavily limit or completely forbid immigration and how many prefer a society in which Swiss citizens have better chances than immigrants. As we see, both indicators decrease between 1996 and 2007 confirming that Swiss have become less xenophobic. As of the ratio of islamophobic people, contrary to xenophobia this indicator increases at a significant

level between the two time periods. It seems that the growing number of Muslim immigrants in the last decade and/or the events and developments related to the terrorist attacks in New York in September 2001 did have an impact on the overall Swiss population's attitudes towards Muslims. This confirms developments in Britain, Germany and France where public support for state accommodation of Muslims' religious practices have decreased after the September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York (Fetzer and Soper 2005: 143-144)

Table 1: Xenophobia and Islamophobia in Switzerland

	1996	*2007*	*Difference*
Against foreigners as neighbours	10.4	7.6	- 2.8**
Against Muslims as neighbours	17.7	21.3	+ 3.6*
Against people with other race as neighbours	8.6	6.4	- 2.2
Against people with other religion as neighbours	-	5.6	-
For restrictive immigration policy	41.6	27.4	-14.2***
For better chances for Swiss	54.7	51.4	-3.3

Levels of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Note: Only Swiss citizens are included.

When we look at xenophobia and islamophobia in the three Swiss language regions we get a similar picture in all three parts (see Table 2). Taking the German part as our reference category there are hardly any statistically significant differences between the three regions.[3] In all three regions the number of people with islamophobic attitudes heavily outnumbers xenophobic people. Moreover, xenophobia decreases in all three regions between 1996 and 2007, however only in the French part at a significant level. The two alternative indicators produce similar results. As for the evolution of islamophobia, we observe that it increases at a significant level in the German and the Italian parts while it remains stable in the French part of Switzerland. How can we explain that interregional differences of the development of islamophobia? The number of immigrants from Muslim countries does not help us understand this difference. While the ratio of Muslim residents is relatively high in the German speaking part of Switzerland (4.7 per cent) it is much lower in the Italian part (1.8 per cent) in 2000 (Bovay and Broquet 2004: 22-25). Moreover, the relative growth of the Muslim population between 1990 and 2000 was highest in the French part of Switzerland (from 1.6 per cent to 3.6 per cent).

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[3] Cf. Kühnel und Leibhold (2007: 138) who show that regarding islamophobia there are hardly any differences between Western and Eastern Germany.

Table 2: Xenophobia and Islamophobia in language regions

	1996			2007			Difference		
	G	F	I	G	F	I	G	F	I
Foreigners	9.9	10.0	12.8	8.3	5.8	8.8	-1.6	-4.2*	-4.0
Muslims	18.9	17.7	14.3	23.0	17.5*	21.5	4.1*	-0.2	7.2*
Other race	8.7	9.0	7.4	5.4	6.4	9.9*	-3.3*	-2.6	2.5
Other religion	-	-	-	4.2	6.7	8.1*	-	-	-
Rest. immigra-tion policy	38.6	47.9*	37.8	26.4	27.7	28.9	-12.2*	-20.2*	-8.9*
Better chances for Swiss	50.3	57.8*	61.8*	51.7	47.5	58.7	1.4	-10.3*	-3.1

Notes: G=German part (category of reference for interregional comparison), F=French part, I=Italian part. Only Swiss citizens are included.
Levels of significance: * p<0.05

To better understand the meaning of these figures let us first compare them with the attitudes towards people that belong to a different race and practice another religion (see Tables 1 and 2). Contrary to Great Britain, the term 'race' is hardly used in Switzerland—least of all does it constitute an official categorization. It is thus difficult to know what Swiss people understand by race—whether they simply consider it as a synonym for foreigners or whether they use it to distinguish people with a different skin colour. Looking at Tables 1 and 2 it seems that people make no difference between foreigners and people from another race. Both groups are equally disliked as neighbours (in an alpha test I got the value 0.7 for these two questions). The same holds true for the three language regions. It is also interesting to observe that in 2007 only a tiny minority of slightly more than 5 per cent of the respondents declared that they do not like to have people as neighbours who practice another religion (this question was not asked in 1996). If we compare this figure with the attitudes towards Muslims we get a first hint for the argument that Muslims are not primarily disliked because of their religion.

To further contextualize xenophobia and islamophobia in Switzerland let us now compare the attitudes towards foreigners and Muslims with the figures from other countries and surveys. Let us first look at xenophobia in other countries that have been part of the WVS. A direct comparison of the two Swiss waves in 1996 and 2007 is difficult as the respective questions have been asked in very few countries in 1996 and the data for the last wave are not yet available. I therefore list the fourth wave (1999 – 2004) in Table 3, which shows the figures for the 15 old EU-members and the US. If we compare the 1999/04 wave with the last Swiss wave we notice that Switzerland is clearly below the mean value regarding xenophobia (cf. Inglehart et al. 2007: 303). In 1996 however, Switzerland was more xenophobic than on average the few countries for which we dispose of data.

Other studies come to similar conclusions. According to Sides and Citrin (2007: 484) and on the basis of the 2002/03 European Social Survey Switzerland belongs to the countries

where the population is least opposed to immigration. The average number of people that perceives negatively the consequences of immigration or that is not willing to let in more immigrants is below the mean values of the other countries. Of the 20 European countries investigated in this survey Switzerland is the second respectively fourth most tolerant country. The results of the U.S. 'Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy' (CID) survey that was conducted in 2005 are less positive and more contradictory for Switzerland (CDACS 2005: 17-19). While Switzerland, besides the United States, is most in favour of cultural diversity, it belongs to those countries where respondents have most often indicated that with regard to taxes and health services foreigners take out more of the country than they put in.

Table 3: Percentage saying they would not like to have immigrants and Muslims as neighbours: EU countries and the US

	1994/99		1999/04	
	Immigrants	*Muslims*	*Immigrants*	*Muslims*
Austria			12.7	15.2
Belgium			15.7	19.8
Denmark			10.6	16.3
Finland	13.3	39.6	12.7	18.7
France			12.1	16.1
Germany	7.2		11.0	12.5
Greece			13.7	20.9
Ireland			12.5	14.4
Italy			16.5	17.2
Luxembourg			9.2	15.4
Netherlands			5.0	12.2
Portugal			2.6	7.6
Spain	7.3	11.6	10.2	13.2
Sweden	4.7	13.0	2.9	9.2
Great Britain	11.6		15.1	14.1
United States	9.5	12.3	10.2	10.9
Mean	8.9	19.1	10.8	14.6
Switzerland	10.4	17.7	(7.6)	(21.3)

What about islamophobia? Since so far hardly any research has been conducted to clarify this question, it is difficult to compare Switzerland with other countries—especially because the few studies that do exist partly use other questions to operationalize attitudes towards Muslims (Fetzer and Soper 2005: ch.5, Cattacin et al. 2007: 39-41, Pew Research Center 2005, Dekker and van der Noll 2007, Gonzales et al. 2007). Looking at Table 2 we notice that according to the data from the last WVS waves Swiss seem to be more islamophobic than the old EU countries and the US on average. In 1996 the situation was different (the data are however difficult to compare especially with the outlier of Finland).

How does islamophobia relate to xenophobia?

In the previous chapter we have seen that in many European countries more people indicate that they do not like to have Muslims as neighbours than immigrants in general (see Table 3). In Switzerland in 2007 there were almost three times more islamophobic than xenophobic people (see Table 1). It seems that people who dislike Muslims as neighbours are not necessarily xenophobic. In order to further analyse the relationship between islamophobia and xenophobia I carried out a factor analysis with all questions concerning disliked neighbours in Table 4. For both surveys the procedure found two factors. Since the first factor consists of very different disliked groups it is difficult to interpret the overall results. However, my aim here is not to explain the overall pattern of groups of people Swiss do not like to have as neighbours. I rather like to investigate how the categories 'immigrants' and 'Muslims' relate to each other. As we see in Table 4 they both load on the same factor, which largely confirms the results by Stolz (2006) and Kühnel and Leibhold (2007). However, in both years 'Muslims' correlate less highly with the first factor than 'immigrants'. Especially in 2007, 'Muslims' are the group that correlates the least with the underlying factor. At the same time it correlates the highest with the second factor among all groups of factor one. Thus, indeed, it appears that people who are islamophobic are also xenophobic and vice versa, the interrelationship is however not as strong as one might expect. For this reason I like to explore some other ways to investigate the link between these two phobias. By doing so, I am particularly interested in which people mentioned Muslims and immigrants as unwanted neighbours and whether or not we can reveal different characteristics for people who are xenophobic and islamophobic. In particular, I will test in the remaining parts of this chapter whether various forms of national self-understanding, religiosity and post-material values are differently related to xenophobia and islamophobia.

Table 4: Factor analysis of attitudes towards different groups of neighbours

	1996		2007	
	1	*2*	*1*	*2*
Unmarried couples			**0.85**	-0.10
Other religion			**0.80**	-0.04
Other language			**0.78**	-0.14
Other race	**0.83**	0.02	**0.78**	-0.01
Immigrants	**0.81**	0.00	**0.73**	-0.05
Muslims	**0.67**	0.18	**0.49**	0.29
People having AIDS	**0.52**	0.43	**0.62**	0.26
Homosexuals	**0.44**	**0.49**	**0.58**	0.22
Drug addicts	0.12	**0.71**	-0.03	**0.83**
Heavy drinkers	-0.09	**0.75**	-0.14	**0.74**

National self-understanding

Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) start their article on the interrelationship between xenophobia and nationalism/patriotism with the question of whether or not pride implies prejudice. A common argument holds that in-group love and out-group hate are reciprocally related (see Brewer 1999). According to this view, one's attitude toward foreigners depends largely on one's national identity. In other words, nationalism/patriotism and xenophobia are the two sides of the same coin: The way we perceive ourselves heavily influences the way we exclude others; a person with a very restrictive understanding of citizenship can also be considered as very xenophobic.

Relating one's national self-understanding and xenophobia in such a way assumes that national pride is highly exclusive. As Viroli (1995: 6) insists, however, one's 'love of country can be generous, compassionate, and intelligent […]'. One can have a very multicultural view on his country and be proud of his or her nation's cultural heterogeneity. In that case pride does not imply prejudice, and xenophobia cannot be explained by one's national self-understanding. Accordingly, love of country does not necessarily come at the expense of tolerance towards foreigners. After all and as Hjerm (1998: 337) rightly sees it, 'people are more or less xenophobic, depending on their type of national identity.' According to Hierm (1998) prejudice towards others does not increase when one identifies oneself strongly with his or her nation but when one has an ethnic and not a civic national identity. People might take pride in different aspects of their nation—some are proud of their nation's history while others are proud of its social security system. Accordingly, considering foreigners as not belonging to one's national community does not mean that one does not show appreciation for them and does not acknowledge that all human beings are accorded certain rights. After all, feelings towards outsiders depend on the kind of interrelationship that predominates between groups respectively on how other groups are perceived and which kind of national self-understanding prevails.

For the 2007 survey in Switzerland we are in the unique position to generate different profiles of national self-understanding. To generate different citizenship profiles in some studies respondents are asked what they are proud of their country. Figueiredo and Elkins (2003), for example, differentiate whether people are rather patriots when they are proud, for example, of their countries democracy, social security system or technology achievements. On the other hand, people who are proud, for example, of their country's sports teams and armed forces are considered as nationalists in their study. While patriots are very tolerant towards foreigners, nationalists are expected to be quite xenophobic.

In our survey the respondents were asked a series of questions concerning criteria that have to be fulfilled to become a Swiss citizen: Having ancestors from Switzerland; having been born in Switzerland; abiding Swiss laws; loss of Swiss citizenship for naturalized delinquents; adopting Swiss customs; required language knowledge; required knowledge of Swiss history; the right for Muslim women to wear a headscarf in public; allowance of dual citizenship; required membership in local associations; unemployment as an obstacle to naturalization; social security dependence as an obstacle to naturalization; having attended school in Switzerland. Attitudes towards these questions tell us how people perceive their nation and which aspects of citizenship they judge crucial (see Helbling 2008: ch.5). In Table 5 I have carried out a factor analysis with these criteria in order to find different national self-understandings.

Table 5: Factor analysis of attitudes towards naturalization criteria

	Basic criteria	*Ethnic criteria*	*New criteria*
Abiding Swiss law	**0.77**	-0.14	0.00
Language knowledge	**0.69**	0.21	0.00
Adopting customs	**0.52**	0.20	0.43
Knowledge of Swiss history	0.42	**0.54**	0.13
Having ancestors in CH	-0.12	**0.74**	0.24
Being born in CH	0.00	**0.75**	0.22
Attended school in CH	0.22	**0.71**	0.24
Be member of an association	0.00	**0.54**	0.00
Dual citizenship	0.20	**0.37**	0.32
Muslim headscarf	0.10	0.13	**0.60**
Welfare recipient	0.00	0.00	**0.82**
Unemployed	0.00	0.13	**0.80**
Expatriate delinquents	0.00	0.15	**0.60**

This procedure finds three factors that can easily be interpreted. The first can be labelled 'basic criteria' and includes the questions of whether foreigners have to abide by the laws, to adopt Swiss customs and to have sufficient knowledge of the language that is spoken at their place of residence in order to get the Swiss passport. I call these the 'basic criteria' as more than 85 per cent of all respondents require these three criteria to be fulfilled. It thus seems that irrespective of whether one has a rather generous or restrictive national self-understanding those criteria are crucial for everyone. Especially as for the first criterion, it can hardly be imagined that someone wants to naturalize a foreign resident who does not respect Swiss laws. Accordingly, for 99 per cent of the respondents this criterion is important. As of the two other criteria that are part of this factor, it appears that speaking a Swiss national language or adopting Swiss customs are not primarily cultural requirements, as they are often presented. One might easily argue that they also constitute criteria for structural integration in countries

with a civic-territorial citizenship model, since the command of the national language and the familiarity of the nation's basic customs are crucial for participating in economic and social life. Since this indicator does not vary a lot, it can be assumed that it does not have a big impact on neither xenophobia nor islamophobia.

The second factor consists of classical 'ethnic criteria' that are often required by people who have a rather restrictive national self-understanding. Especially the two criteria 'having ancestors in Switzerland' and 'being born in Switzerland' reflect this idea. But also the criteria that candidates have to have attended school in Switzerland, to have a good knowledge of Swiss history and to be member of an association indicate that foreigners have to be heavily assimilated before they can become member of the Swiss community. Consequently, I expect this indicator have a big impact on both xenophobic and islamophobic attitudes.

The third factor combines criteria that have rather recently sparked violent political debates. The question of whether it poses a problem when a candidate for naturalization wears a Muslim headscarf has become important only in the last ten years when the number of Muslim immigrants has heavily increased. The debates on whether it is possible to naturalize people who depend on the social security system and/or are unemployed and on whether delinquent naturalized Swiss should loose their Swiss passport is rather new, as well, and often related to Muslim candidates. As a matter of fact, members of this group of applicants for naturalization belong to lower social classes than immigrants from West European countries and thus are more likely to be unemployed and/or to depend on the social security system. Moreover, in political debates it is often argued that the crime rate is notably high among young immigrants and newly naturalized people from Muslim countries. It thus can be assumed that the respondents think of migrants from such countries if they indicate that they do not like to naturalize people who depend on the social security system or that they prefer that freshly naturalized delinquents loose their passport. As a consequence, I expect this indicator to mainly influence islamophobic attitudes.

Let us now test these arguments. All the following tables are structured the following way: Models 1a and 2a list the coefficients of the impact of the respective variables on xenophobia and islamophobia respectively. In Models 1b and 2b I test the variables by controlling for a series of more classic variables in xenophobia studies. As I am only interested in the main variables, the coefficients of the control variables are not shown here. I control for education, the perception of increasing vandalism, worsening of the economy and disappearance of Swiss culture as well as for age and sex. To measure the impact of education, I use a dichotomized indicator differentiating whether or not a respondent has a general qualification

for university entrance (A-level). For the 'perception-variables' I use five questions for which people indicated to which degree they fear that vandalism increases in their neighbourhood and/or in Switzerland, that the economic situation worsens in their neighbourhood and/or Switzerland and that the Swiss culture is threatened. I list the odd ratios in order to be able to directly compare the coefficients. For all the analyses I excluded people that are not Swiss. As some of the questions I use to operationalize my theoretical concepts have been asked only in 2007 I test my arguments only for the last survey. Where I was able to test the arguments for the 1996 wave I will report the results in the text.

As we can see in Table 6, on the whole, my expectations concerning a differentiation between xenophobia and islamophobia have to be rejected. My hypothesis that a national self-understanding that is related to 'new criteria' has a higher positive impact on hostile attitudes towards Muslims than towards immigrants is not confirmed. Especially when we control for other variables the coefficients are almost the same (see Models 1b and 2b in Table 6). As expected, an ethnic national self-understanding has a significant impact on both xenophobia and islamophobia. This strengthens the argument that both phenomena belong to the same underlying pattern and that Muslims are perceived as a thread for ethnic and cultural rather than for religious matters. As expected, people who require that candidates for naturalization fulfil some basic criteria are not necessarily xenophobic. However and for reasons I am not able to give account of, the general understanding of citizenship has a positive impact on is-lamophobia. Since the questions concerning naturalization criteria have not been asked in 1996 a comparison between the two surveys is not possible.

Table 6: Impact of national self-understanding

| | Xenophobia | | Islamophobia | |
	1a	1b	2a	2b
Basic criteria	1.18	1.17	1.42***	1.43**
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Ethnic criteria	1.46***	1.44***	1.31***	1.28***
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.07
New criteria	2.22***	2.25***	2.54***	2.27***
	(0.38)	(0.42)	(0.27)	(0.26)
$PseudoR^2$	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.14
N	973	932	969	928

Notes: Logistic regression analysis, log – odds, standard deviations in brackets
Levels of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Religion

One important question I seek to answer here is whether islamophobic people consider Mus-lims as a cultural or a religious threat. A promising way to treat this question is to compare

the attitudes of religious people towards foreigners in general and Muslims in particular. The obvious question we have to tackle first is what does it mean to be religious? In our secularized society in which the religious cleavage has lost its importance, for the majority of people their (formal) religious affiliation does not influence any of their attitudes any more. Accordingly, I expect different attitudes among secularized and non-secularized Christians who might be particularly concerned by the growth of a new religious community (Fetzer and Soper 2005: 137-139). Religious people are not simply members of a church but practice their faith. This can be done in a more formal way by regularly going to church. On the other hand and especially nowadays when the official churches more and more lose support, religiosity can also be lived more privately and in alternative ways. The WVS questionnaire allows us to account for both aspects as people where asked how often they go to church and whether or not and independently of how often they attend Mass they consider themselves as religious persons.

One's religiosity might have diverging effects. It might be hypothesized that Christians are islamophobic, but not xenophobic. Such people are very tolerant towards foreigners in general, as their faith obliges them to appreciate all human beings. It might even be that their religious identity is stronger than the national one, and that, henceforth, nationalist categories are completely irrelevant for them. The only study that has so far investigated the impact of religiosity on xenophobia in Switzerland came to the conclusion that both phenomena are positively correlated (Kneubühler 2001). The correlation is however very low and disappears when controlled for patriotism and conventionalism. It thus appears that in this case 'religiosity' is closely linked to conservative and nationalist values.

As of islamophobia, it can be assumed that catholics and protestants are hostile towards Muslims as they are afraid of other religions or do not share their beliefs. They consider Islam as incompatible with Christianity and are disturbed when Muslims claim religious rights. In other words, as they are closely affiliated with the religious majority, they are opposed to the accommodation of new religious groups. The question is however, whether nowadays such religious conflicts or even cleavages still exist and are relevant. In their comparative study on Britain, France and Germany Fetzer and Soper (2005: 133-137) found that the members of the religious majority are not significantly more hostile towards Muslim than members of minority religious groups (such as Jews or Hindus).

This might be explained by the fact that in modern societies the divide between religious and non-religious people becomes more important than the one between different faiths. As a consequence, it might be that autochtone religious groups support new ones as they all

constitute minorities in Western societies and have to fight for their rights. This is Fetzer's (2000: 6) marginality argument: "One's solidarity with other marginalized groups will increase, moreover, to the extent that one is oneself marginalized." Marginal groups in our case are not those who formally belong to a religion—be it a majority religion such as Protestantism or Catholicism, or a minority religion such as Judaism or Hinduism—, but those who practice a religion and/or regularly go to church. In other words, we do not observe struggles between religious groups, but "between those who think religion has a place in secular public culture and those who think not." (Modood 1994: 72)

In Table 7 I test the arguments I have developed in the forgoing paragraphs. First, I am interested how more traditional religiosity, operationalied by 'church attendance', influences one's attitudes towards foreigners and Muslims. The variable 'religious person' proposes an alternative operationalisation for religiosity. This indicator is based on the question of whether or not and independently of how often one attends Mass one considers oneself as a religious persons.

Although none of the coefficients are significant, we observe some interesting patterns. First, we see that people who consider themselves as religious persons are less hostile towards foreigners than those who regularly go to church. As Kneubühler (2001) has already revealed, it seems that 'traditional religiosity' is closely linked to conservative and nationalist values. On the other hand, 'unconventional religiosity' seems to better reflect the values of tolerance religious people are often ascribed. It is getting even more interesting when we compare islamophobia to xenophobia. In Models 2a and 2b in Table 7 all coefficients are negative. These findings seem to confirm that religious people independently of whether one belongs to a majority or minority religion and even if they are hostile towards immigrants in general show some solidarity towards members of another religion. Although the probability that the coefficients in Table 6 are not random is too high to make confident statements, it might be that at least for religious people islamophobia is not the same as xenophobia. The 1996 data produce similar results (not shown here). There is only one difference: church attendance has a negative impact on both xenophobia and islamophobia in 1996, however not at a significant level.

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Table 7: Impact of religiosity

	Xenophobia		Islamophobia	
	1a	1b	2a	2b
Church attendance	1.04	1.02	0.93	0.92
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Religious person	0.69	0.65	0.94	0.91
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)
PseudoR^2	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.06
N	804	764	800	761

Notes: Logistic regression analysis, log – odds, standard deviations in brackets
Levels of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Post-materialism

As we have seen, the impact of religiosity on attitudes towards foreigners and Muslims is related to questions of tolerance and group-solidarity. I now would like to approach these particular aspects from another perspective by asking whether or not post-materialists make a difference between immigrants in general and those from Muslim countries in particular. According to my knowledge, Inglehart et al. (2003) have so far done the only study to test the relationship between post-materialism—as defined and operationalized by Inglehart—and xenophobia. In Iraq, they have conducted what they call a natural experiment on the impact of insecurity on xenophobia and in-group solidarity. Based on Inglehart (1997) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) they argue "that 'existential security'—the feeling that survival can be taken for granted—is conductive to interpersonal trust, tolerance of foreigners and other out-groups, openness to social change, and a prodemocratic political culture." (Inglehart et al. 2003: 298)

Their insecurity indicator reflects a polarization between survival values (which tend to be emphasized by those for whom survival is relatively insecure) and self-expression values (emphasized by those who take survival for granted) (Inglehart et al. 2003: 300). Across the 80 countries for which they have data available, among the lowest quartile emphasizing survival values, 20 per cent say that they would not like to have foreigners as neighbours. Among the top quartile, only 8 per cent did so. For their special case Iraq they found that 90 per cent reject foreigners as neighbours, what they explain with the extraordinary economic and physical insecurity in this country at the moment of their study in the last two months of 2004.

Iser and Schmidt (2003) investigate the impact of values on both xenophobia and islamophobia by relying on Schwartz' (2003a,b) indicators to measure values. Contrary to this chapter they do not develop arguments how values could have different impacts on xenophobic and islamophobic attitudes, but rather consider these two concepts as similar social phenomena. In his various studies Schwartz (2003a,b) has shown that there are ten values that are

important in each society: stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition, security, power, achievement and hedonism. These values are arranged along two dimensions: The first emphasizes the conflict between the 'acceptance of the other' (self-transcendence) and the tendency to mainly focus on one's own success (self-enhancement). The second dimension underlines the tension between 'openness to change' and conservatism.

Iser and Schmidt (2003) show that people who attribute importance to the values that belong to the 'self-transcendence' (universalism and benevolence) and the 'openness to change' poles (stimulation and self-direction) are much more tolerant towards foreigners and Muslims than people with traditional and conservative values. The results concerning attitudes towards foreigners are confirmed by Davis and Davenport (1999) as well as Flanagan and Lee (2003) (see also Davis 2000). In their assessment of Inglehart's postmaterialist index Davis and Davenport (1999) found that postmaterialists are significantly more trustful of black American, Hispanic Americans, Mexicans, Russians and Chinese. Flanagan and Lee (2003), who use a slightly different indicator, also came to the conclusion that postmodernists are not only tolerant toward new and different lifestyles but also toward ethnic minorities. It seems obvious that these people are very tolerant towards people who have another nationality, as such collective categories are rather irrelevant for them. On the contrary, postmaterialists are substantially more distrustful of virtually all social and political institutions and are not willing to make sacrifices to their nation (Flanagan and Lee 2003: 267).

If we agree that postmaterialists reject the idea of absolute rules and moral principles (and are therefore more open toward outsiders) the question emerges how they perceive groups that might not share postmaterialist value. Iser and Schmidt (2003) found that Schwarz indicators have similar impacts on both xenophobia and islamophobia. However, a different result could also have been expected. It might be that they reject Muslims as they often are ascribed values that stand in full contradiction to postmaterial values such as individualism and self-direction. In particular, they might criticize the role of women and the general lack of self-determination in Muslim societies. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 292) point out, it is not true that in a spirit of postmodern relativism everything is tolerated. Especially the violation of individual rights is not considered acceptable by postmaterialists.

Let us know test these arguments by measuring, first, the impact of Inglehart's indicator of postmaterialism (Table 8) and, second, the Schwartz indexes (Table 9). To measure the impact of postmaterialism I rely in Table 8 on Inglehart's 12-item indicator. I however got the same results with the 4-item indicator. It appears in Table 8 that postmaterialists are both less xenophobic and less islamophobic than materialists. The argument that postmaterialits could

be more hostile towards Muslims as they might not share their basic values is not true. On the contrary, the coefficients for islamophobia are higher and more significant than those for xenophobia. Moreover, the indicator is no longer significant for xenophobia when we control for other variables (see Model 1b in Table 8). If we test the same hypothesis with the 1996 data we get the same results (not shown here).

Table 8: Impact of Inglehart's postmaterialism indicator

	Xenophobia		Islamophobia	
	1a	1b	2a	2b
Postmaterialism	0.79*	0.84	0.69***	0.75***
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.06)
$PseudoR^2$	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.08
N	1052	989	1046	984

Notes: Logistic regression analysis, log – odds, standard deviations in brackets
Levels of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

The Schwartz indicators give us a slightly different picture in Table 9. Following the lead of Iser and Schmidt (2003: 69-72), we test six indicators. While they confirm their expectations that self-direction and universalism has a negative impact on both xenophobia and islamophobia, they get equally clear results for the positive impact of conformity, tradition and achievement. Since hedonism stands for both egoism and openness Iser and Schmid (2003) do not expect a specific direction of the impact of this indicator.

As of the indicators for which I expect a positive impact Iser and Schmidt's results are confirmed by my analysis, however not always at a significant level. People who defend traditional values, prefer to conform to group norms and for whom achievement is important tend to be more hostile towards both foreigners and Muslims. The positive impact of achievement can be explained by the fact that achievement-oriented people consider immigrants as competitors and feel superior to them. It gets highly interesting when we look at the characteristics that are ascribed to postmaterialists. Self-direction, universalism and hedonism have not the same influence on xenophobia and islamophobia. While universal values have a significant negative impact on xenophobia, when we regress islamophobia on universalism the relationship is no longer significant. Indeed, self-direction and hedonism do not produce significant coefficients, however, the direction changes between xenophobic and islamophobic values. It thus might be that postmaterialists are indeed tolerant towards immigrants in general, but hostile towards Muslims who do not share their basic values. Unfortunately, most of the relevant questions to operationalize the Schwartz indexes have not been asked in 1996.

Table 9: Impact of Schwartz' indicators

| | Xenophobia | | Islamophobia | |
	1a	1b	2a	2b
Self-direction	0.95	0.98	1.17	1.06
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Universalism	0.63*	0.59*	0.82	0.78
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Hedonism	1.25	1.25	0.96	0.99
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Achievement	2.21**	2.15**	1.68**	1.66**
	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Conformity	1.49*	1.26	1.27*	1.09
	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Tradition	1.10	0.98	1.10	1.06
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.14)
PseudoR^2	0.12	0.08	0.13	0.07
N	973	952	969	948

Notes: Logistic regression analysis, log – odds, standard deviations in brackets
Levels of significance: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, ***$p<0.001$

Conclusion

Like many other Western European countries Switzerland has witnessed a growing number of immigrants from Muslim countries. The accommodation of these migrants as well as islamist terrorism has lead to growing political tensions within Western societies. This evolution has motivated some social scientists to study islamophobia. This chapter set out to better understand this new social phenomenon by comparing it with the better known concept of xenophobia. First, I sought to investigate whether in Switzerland prejudices against immigrants in general and those from Muslim countries have changed in the course of the last decade. As it appeared, hostilities against foreigners have clearly decreased between 1996 and 2007. This might be rather surprising given the growing number of foreigners and the success of right-wing populist forces.

It appeared that in both years 1996 and 2007 much more people indicated that they do not like to have Muslims as neighbours than immigrants. At first sight, this suggests that islamophobia is different from xenophobia, as much more people dislike immigrants from Muslim countries. A factor analysis has however revealed that both phenomena belong to the same underlying factor. Despite the tempting conclusion, this does not answer our question whether or not islamophobia is just a concretisation of xenophobia. It might very well be that the same persons are hostile against immigrants and Muslims for different reasons. I therefore proposed some theoretical considerations and tested concrete arguments why islamophobia could be different from xenophobia.

Overall, the results of this analysis suggest that islamophobia is the same as xenophobia. There are however some hints that let us assume a contrary conclusion. A first analysis of the influence of three different concepts of national identity showed that they all have a positive impact on both xenophobic and islamophobic attitudes. The second test of religiosity produces no significant results. Looking at the algebraic signs it however appeared that religious people who regularly go to church are more xenophobic but less islamophobic than ordinary people. This would lend support to the arguments that religious people are indeed conservative and thus hostile towards foreigners but show signs of solidarity towards other religious group. A third test of the influence of postmaterial values produced contradictory results. While Inglehart's postmaterial index clearly reduces islamophobia, it does not necessarily have a negative impact on xenophobia. On the other hand, the indexes by Schwartz for self-direction and universalism have different impacts on these two variables suggesting that postmaterial persons are tolerant towards foreigners in general but hostile towards immigrants from Muslim countries who do not share their basic values of individualism and gender equality.

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